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BEST INTERESTS EQUALS ZEALOUS ADVOCACY: A NOT SO
RADICAL VIEW OF HOLISTIC REPRESENTATION
FOR CHILDREN ACCUSED OF CRIME
ELLEN MARRUS*
INTRODUCTION
A lawyer in adult criminal court represents an eighteen-year-old
client charged with burglary who does not want to plead guilty, even
though he is guilty.' The lawyer explains that quantitatively and quali-
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1. In every state, eighteen-year-olds are treated as adults for purposes of criminal lia-
bility. See, e.g., ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 8-201 (3), (6) (West 1999 & Supp. 2001) (stating that
an "' [a]dult' means a person who is eighteen years of age or older"); see also CAL. WELF. &
INST. CODE § 603(a) (West 1998) (stating that a petition must be filed injuvenile court first
if the person is under the age of eighteen when the alleged criminal act was committed);
D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2301(3) (2001 & Supp. 2002) (defining the word "child" to mean "an
individual who is under 18 years of age"). In some states, persons younger than eighteen
years old may be charged as adults. See N.Y. Soc. SERv. LAw § 371(5) (McKinney 1992)
(stating that a "'U]uvenile delinquent' means a person over seven and less than sixteen
years of age" who commits an adult criminal act); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 51.02(2) (A)
(Vernon 2002) (defining a delinquent child as a person who is "ten years of age or older
and under seventeen years of age"). The jurisdictional age factor depends on the age of
the child when the act was committed rather than the age at the time the petition is filed.
See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 603(a).
Moreover, all states have waiver provisions which permit children as young as ten in
some states to be transferred to adult criminal court. See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33,
§ 5506(a) (2001) (describing the criminal offenses under which ajuvenile court may trans-
fer a child between ten and fourteen to criminal court); see also GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-
28(b) (2) (A) (Supp. 2002) (giving exclusive jurisdiction to the superior court for the trial
of a person between thirteen and seventeen years of age alleged of committing any one of
seven enumerated offenses); IND. COnE ANN. § 31-30-3-4 (Michie 1997) (stating that ajuve-
nile court can waive its jurisdiction upon meeting certain criteria set forth within the state);
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 938.183(1) (West 2000) (providing original jurisdiction to the criminal
courts over a juvenile between the age of ten and fourteen).
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tatively there is more than sufficient evidence to convict. Further-
more, counsel advises the accused of the unpleasant facts that over
ninety percent of defendants in state criminal courts plead guilty,2
and that sentences after trial tend to be higher than those obtained by
plea.3 Under these circumstances, the attorney advises her client to
plead guilty. If, however, the client persists, defense counsel will put
on her advocate hat and use all her professional skills to gain an ac-
quittal.4 If that fails, she will try to prevent incarceration or limit the
There are three types of waiver: discretionary, statutory, and prosecutorial. W. James
Ellison, State Execution of Juveniles: Defining "Youth" as a Mitigating Factor for Imposing a Sen-
tence of Less Than Death, 11 LAw & PSYCHOL. REV. 1, 10-14 (1987). The due process require-
ments for waiver hearings mandated by Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 552-53 (1966),
apply only to discretionary judicial waivers. See United States v. Bland, 472 F.2d 1329, 1336
n.26 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (explaining that a prosecutorial waiver of jurisdiction does not re-
quire due process); see also Woodard v. Wainwright, 556 F.2d 781, 787 (5th Cir. 1977)
(upholding a Florida statute that, in essence, allows the prosecutor to determine which
juveniles can be tried as adults). See generally Lisa S. Beresford, Comment, Is Lowering the
Age at Which Juveniles Can Be Transferred to Adult Criminal Court the Answer to Juvenile Crime? A
State-y-State Assessment, 37 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 783, 793-817 (2000) (examining different
state laws for transferring juveniles to the adult criminal system).
2. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS-
2000, at 457 (Kathleen Maquire & Ann L. Pastore eds., 2001) (indicating that ninety-one
percent of all felony convictions in state court in 1996 were obtained by guilty pleas).
3. See DAVID J. LEVIN ET AL., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, STATE COURT SENTENCING
OF CONVICTED FELONS, 1996, at 30-40 (2000) (stating that sentences for the same type of
offense were longest for those felons convicted in ajury trial (twelve and one-half years) as
compared with sentences given after a bench trial (five years and ten months), or a guilty
plea (four and one-half years)). Presumably, the reason for the higher sentences after trial
is to demonstrate to defendants the risk of insisting on a trial. See Michael E. Tigar, 1969
Term-Foreword: Waiver of Constitutional Rights: Disquiet in the Citadel, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1, 19-
25 (1970) (discussing reasons why a defendant may enter a guilty plea even though his
procedural rights may have been violated).
4. An attorney has a duty to be a zealous advocate for his or her client. See MODEL
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.3 cmt. (2002); MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY Ca-
non 7 (2000). Thus, a defendant has the right to test the prosecution's evidence to be sure
that guilt is proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, during the trial, the defense
attorney may cross-examine prosecution witnesses who are telling the truth in an attempt
to discredit their testimony. See Monroe H. Freedman, Professional Responsibility of the Crimi-
nal Defense Lawyer: The Three Hardest Questions, 64 MICH. L. REV. 1469, 1474-75 (1966) [here-
inafter Professional Responsibility] (arguing that one of the three hardest questions for a
defense attorney can be whether it is "proper to cross-examine for the purpose of discredit-
ing the reliability or the credibility of a witness whom you know to be telling the truth" and
concluding that "the attorney is obligated to attack, if he can, the reliability or credibility of
an opposing witness whom he knows to be truthful"); see also MONROE H. FREEDMAN, LAw-
YERS' ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM 43-49 (1975) [hereinafter LAwYERS' ETHICS] (discuss-
ing the cross-examination of a truthful witness in an attempt to discredit her). Obviously,
an attorney cannot use perjured testimony, bribe witnesses or jurors, or commit any crimi-
nal act to win an acquittal. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a) (setting forth
rules governing the truthfulness of a lawyer's communications to a tribunal); MODEL CODE
OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-5, 7-26, 7-28 (prohibiting a lawyer from aiding the criminal
conduct of a client); MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102 (A)(4), (6), (7)
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prison term by presenting mitigating evidence at sentencing, such as:
the client's mother is a junkie, there is no food at home, and the cli-
ent grew up in a chaotic household.' The probation department rec-
ommends a two-year prison sentence. Although the defendant's
record demonstrates that he will undoubtedly need the lawyer's ser-
vices again in the very near future, the attorney succeeds in getting
probation for her client. Nobody blinks an eye.
Transport that lawyer to a delinquency proceeding in juvenile
court.6 This time she represents a sixteen-year-old client accused of
burglary who does not want to plead guilty, even though he is, and
even though there is more than sufficient evidence to establish his
guilt. Almost all children in juvenile court plead guilty.7 But they do
so, at least in large part, because the "best interests of the child" is the
accepted mantra,' and any "bargaining" that might hinder the child's
rehabilitation would theoretically conflict with that notion.9 The at-
torney pressures her client to admit his complicity. After the plea and
(stating that a lawyer shall not "[k]nowingly use perjured testimony," "[p]articipate in the
creation or preservation" of false evidence, or "[c]ounsel or assist his client in conduct that
the lawyer knows to be illegal or fraudulent"). Therefore, in this instance, the attorney,
knowing her client is guilty, cannot allow him to take the stand and give perjurious testi-
mony even if the client so desires.
Furthermore, an attorney who tells her client she will report his perjury to the court is
not guilty of providing ineffective assistance of counsel. See Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157,
168 (1986) (agreeing with ethical rules that require a lawyer to disclose his client's perjury
to the court). But see FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' ETHICS, supra, at 31-41 (discussing how criminal
defense attorneys have a professional responsibility to examine a perjurious client); Freed-
man, Professional Responsibility, supra, at 1477 (describing strategies for a lawyer to ethically
examine a client who intends to commit perjury).
5. If the length of the sentence is statutorily mandated, mitigating factors will be irrel-
evant. See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 995 (1991) (refusing to extend "required
mitigation" claims in capital cases to non-capital cases).
6. Generally, statutes define delinquents as children who commit acts that if commit-
ted by an adult would constitute a crime. See ALA. CODE § 12-15-1(8)-(9) (Supp. 2002);
Ajuz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-201(10)-(11) (West 1999 & Supp. 2001); LA. CHILDREN'S CODE
ANN. § 804(3)-(4) (West Supp. 2002); N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAw § 371(5) (McKinney Supp.
2003); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 51.03(a) (Vernon 2002). In some states ajuvenile can be
adjudicated a delinquent for violating an order of probation, even one imposed on a status
offender for non-criminal behavior such as truancy or running away from home. See, e.g.,
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 51.03(b) (2)-(3).
7. See State ex rel. C. A. H. v. Strickler, 251 S.E.2d 222, 226 (W. Va. 1979) (noting that
"most juvenile cases are resolved by guilty pleas"); Wallace J. Mlyniec, A Judge's Ethical Di-
lemma: Assessing a Child's Capacity to Choose, 64 FoRDHAM L. REV. 1873, 1898 (1996) (stating
that "courts accept pleas of guilty in the vast majority ofjuvenile delinquency cases").
8. See Linda F. Giardino, Note, Statutory Rhetoric: The Reality Behind Juvenile justice Poli-
cies in America, 5 J.L. & Poy'v 223, 275-76 (1996) (commenting that "considerations of best
interests of the child still permeate . . . juvenile law").
9. See Marygold S. Melli, Juvenile Justice Reform in Context, 1996 Wis. L. REv. 375, 394
(citing Dennis J. Berry, Juvenile Justice: A Wisconsin Blueprint for Change, Wis. LAw., Mar.
1995, at 30).
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considering the youth's past record, the lawyer simply accepts the "ex-
pert" recommendation of probation and that the boy needs a "struc-
tured environment."' 0 The child is sentenced to two years in a state
prison for juveniles, euphemistically called a training school.1' The
fact that his mother is ajunkie, there is no food at home, and he lives
in a chaotic environment are what primarily motivates the probation
department to recommend commitment. 2 Nobody blinks an eye.
What happened to the advocate hat that the lawyer wore in crimi-
nal court? She left it there, because, after all, the juvenile court sys-
tem is benign,'" the records are sealed,14 the proceedings are
confidential,15 there is no punishment, just treatment,' 6 and last, but
not least, her client needs "help."
10. These code words are often used by probation officials to designate that the child is
to be committed to a locked or secure facility. Indeed, many juvenile facilities confine
their residents. See IND. CODE ANN. § 31-31-8-2 (Michie 1997) (defining "[a] juvenile de-
tention facility [as] a secure facility... used for the... treatment ofjuveniles"); N.Y. EXEC.
LAw § 508(1) (McKinney 1996) (describing New York's juvenile offender institutions as
.secure facilities for the care and confinement of juvenile offenders"); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 10, § 7301-1.3(30) (West Supp. 2003) (defining a "'[t] raining school' or 'secure facility'
[in which a juvenile is placed as] a facility, maintained by the state exclusively for the care,
education, training, treatment, and rehabilitation of delinquent juveniles or youthful of-
fenders which relies on locked rooms and buildings, and fences for physical restraint in
order to control behavior of its residents").
11. Several states refer to the secure facility in which ajuvenile is detained after disposi-
tion as a "training school" or an "industrial school." ALA. CODE § 44-1-2(18) (Supp. 2002);
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-1-103(109) (West Supp. 2001); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.
15:1031 (West 1992); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 18A, § 8 (West 1994).
12. See, e.g., Henry & Rilla White Found., Inc. v. Migdal, 720 So. 2d 568, 572 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1998) (stating that "[t]he safety of the child is one factor a juvenile judge might
properly consider at a disposition hearing"). Cf In re Lloyd, 308 N.Y.S.2d 419, 421 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1970) (reversing the placement of a child status offender in a training school
because he was an emotionally neglected child rather than someone in need of state
oversight).
13. Trimble v. State, 478 A.2d 1143, 1163 (Md. 1984) (referring to the "benign goals of
the juvenile system"); Julian W. Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARv. L. REv. 104, 117, 120
(1910) (asserting that "the aim of the [juvenile] court . . . is to have the child and the
parents feel, not so much the power, as the friendly interest of the state .... The child...
should .. .be made to feel that he is the object of its care and solicitude.").
14. HAw. REv. STAT. ANN. § 571-84 (Michie Supp. 2001); IDAHO CODE § 20-525(2)
(Michie 1997); MoNr. CODE ANN. § 41-5-216(1) (2000). But see Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S.
308, 320 (1974) (finding that the petitioner's right under the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments to confront a witness outweighed the confidentiality of juvenile records).
Furthermore, juvenile records can be used to determine sentences in criminal court in
many states. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(3) (West 1997) (listing the conditions when
"[a] prior juvenile adjudication shall constitute a prior felony conviction" to enhance a
prison sentence).
15. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 868.5(b) (West Supp. 2002); see also D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-
2332(b) (Supp. 2002); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 24-4.1-303(6) (a) (West 2001); IDAHO CODE
§ 20-525(2). However, a statutory guarantee of confidentiality does not necessarily mean
that the court will be closed. See United States v. Three Juveniles, 61 F.3d 86, 92 (1st Cir.
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Although they are becoming increasingly punitive," the juvenile
courts still try to obfuscate the similarities between criminal court and
juvenile court by using a different vocabulary.18 The child is a respon-
dent, 9 not a defendant; a child is not indicted for the commission of
a crime, 20 a petition for delinquency is filed;2 1 there is no bail hear-
1995) (holding that the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act grants district courts the discre-
tionary authority to close juvenile proceedings on a case-by-case basis); see also McKeiver v.
Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 554-55 (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) (arguing that ajury trial is not constitutionally required at an adjudicatory hearing
in a juvenile court delinquency proceeding because "a similar protection [of the Sixth
Amendment right to ajury trial] may be obtained when an accused may in essence appeal
to the community at large"). Yet, most states limit public access to juvenile proceedings.
See ALA. CODE § 12-15-65(a) (Supp. 2002) (excluding the general public from juvenile pro-
ceedings); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 676 (West Supp. 2003) (stating that juvenile pro-
ceedings are closed to the public subject to statutory exceptions); N.Y. JuD. CT. AcTs
§ 341.1 (McKinney 1999) (prohibiting the general public from attending juvenile
proceedings).
16. Originally juvenile statutes did not speak of punishment, but in recent years, pun-
ishment has been added as an appropriate goal of the juvenile justice system. For exam-
ple, the earlier Texas statute provided that the purpose of the juvenile justice system was
"to provide for the care, the protection, and the wholesome moral, mental, and physical
development of children coming within its provisions." See TEx. FAM. CODE ANN.
§ 51.01(1) (Vernon 1995) (amended 1995). In 1995 this section was amended so as to
"provide for the protection of the public and public safety [as well as] to promote the
concept of punishment for criminal acts." TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 51.01(1), (2)(a)
(Vernon 2002).
17. See Barry C. Feld, The Transformation of the Juvenile Court-Part II: Race and the "Crack
Down" on Youth Crime, 84 MINN. L. REv. 327, 328 (1999) (arguing that we are seeing more
juvenile offenders being tried as adults as well as 'jurisprudential changes that de-empha-
size rehabilitation and escalate punitive sanctions for ordinary delinquents"); Julianne P.
Sheffer, Note, Serious and Habitual Juvenile Offender Statutes: Reconciling Punishment and Reha-
bilitation Within the Juvenile Justice System, 48 VAND. L. REV. 479, 483-84 (1995) (stating that
evidence indicates that "the juvenile court is becoming more punitive").
18. Feld, supra note 17, at 338.
19. Many states refer to the child in juvenile court as the "respondent." See, e.g., N.Y.
FAM. CT. AcT § 301.2(2) (McKinney Supp. 2002).
20. The Fifth Amendment right to indictment in criminal cases is not considered fun-
damental, and, thus, does not apply in state cases. See Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516,
538 (1884) (upholding state law which permitted initiation of criminal cases by informa-
tion rather than grand jury indictment). However, many jurisdictions, as a matter of state
law, require indictments, at least for serious felonies. See Miss. CONST. art. III, § 27; State v.
Holloway, 130 A.2d 562, 565 (Conn. 1957) (requiring an indictment in all cases where
there is a possibility of life imprisonment). That being the case, the denial of grand jury
indictments in juvenile cases would also not violate due process. Of course, an equal pro-
tection claim might be asserted if a state used indictments for adults and notjuveniles. See
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 61 (1967) (Black, J., concurring) (arguing that it violates equal
protection under the Fourteenth Amendment for a state to deny children, who can be
tried as adults, the same constitutional safeguards as afforded adults). However, the Court
has never upheld an equal protection claim in a juvenile delinquency case.
21. See ALAsivA STAT. § 47.12.250(b) (Michie Supp. 2001) (stating that a peace officer,
after detaining a minor, may file a delinquency petition within twelve hours alleging the
delinquency of the minor); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 631 (a) (West 1998) (stating that
[VOL. 62:288
2003] BEST INTERESTS EQUALS ZEALous ADVOCACY 293
ing,22 rather a detention hearing;23 there is no trial, only an adjudica-
tory hearing;24 there is no guilty plea, the child either admits or
stipulates to the allegations of the petition;25 there is no criminal con-
viction, merely a finding of fact or an adjudication that the child en-
gaged in delinquent conduct;26  there is no sentence, just a
dispositional hearing;27 and the child is not sentenced to prison, but
rather committed to a treatment facility or training school.2
The nomenclature in juvenile court may be different from that in
criminal court, but the essentials are much the same. Persons are
charged with penal offenses, and, if found guilty, are restrained in
their liberty. 29 For adults, these possible consequences mean entitle-
forty-eight hours is the maximum time of detention for a minor without criminal com-
plaint); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-2-512 (West 1999) (granting the district attorney the
discretion to file a delinquency petition within seventy-two hours if he believes additional
action is needed against ajuvenile); N.Y. FAM. CT. Acr 310.1 (1) (McKinney 1999) (stating
"[a] proceeding to adjudicate a person ajuvenile delinquent is originated by the filing of a
petition" within thirty days or the agency will inform the complainant in writing of its
failure to meet this deadline).
22. See, e.g., Doe v. State, 487 P.2d 47, 52 (Alaska 1971) (finding that the adult bail
system is inappropriate for juveniles).
23. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 635 (West Supp. 2003) (listing the factors a court
considers during a detention hearing); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-2-508(3) (a) (II) (West
1999) (noting that the primary purpose of the detention hearing is to determine prior to
the hearing whether and under what conditions a juvenile may be released).
24. See, e.g., ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. 8-202(c) (2) (West Supp. 2002) (stating that a minor
has an adjudicatory hearing to determine if he or she has committed a delinquent act).
Some states, however, retain the term "trial" for juvenile proceedings. See, e.g., 705 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. 405/5-105 (West Supp. 2002) (replacing the term "adjudicatory hearing"
with the term "trial").
25. See IND. CODE ANN. § 31-37-12-8 (Michie 1997) (referring to ajuvenile admitting to
allegations); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 3305 (West Supp. 2001) (allowing a juvenile to
admit to the allegations of a petition); N.Y. FAM. CT. AcTr § 321.2(1) (McKinney 1999)
(providing a juvenile the right to admit allegations); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 938.30 (4) (a)-(b)
(West 2000) (stating that in a plea hearing ajuvenile may admit or plead no contest to the
allegations in the petition).
26. Most states enter a finding that the child committed a delinquent act at the close of
the adjudicatory hearing. See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 702 (West 1998) (stating that
"[a]fter hearing the evidence, the court [may] make a finding" of delinquency).
27. See ALA. CODE § 12-15-72 (1995) (specifying that a disposition is not a conviction
nor does it impede any civil rights of the child); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 706 (West
1998) (stating that the court will hear evidence as to the correct disposition of the youth);
N.Y. FAM. CT. Acr § 345.1 (McKinney 2002) (providing the court "shall . . .schedule a
dispositional hearing").
28. See IND. CODE ANN. § 31-31-8-2 (Michie 1997) (describing similar characteristics be-
tween a juvenile detention facility and prison, yet explicitly distinguishing between the
two); N.Y. EXEC. LAw § 508 (McKinney 1996) (establishing special confinement facilities
for juveniles); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 7301-1.3(30) (West Supp. 2003) (describing a
state facility that can be likened to prison, but is specifically not considered as such).
29. See LEVIN ET AL., supra note 3, at I (explaining that offenses classified as felonies
typically call for incarceration of one year or more in prison); see also THE REAL WAR ON
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ment to counsel. 30 But, in the past, courts treated children differ-
ently. In fact, it was not until its 1967 decision, In re Gault,3 that the
United States Supreme Court recognized that due process also pro-
videsjuveniles the right to counsel.3 2 However, making this promise a
reality requires more than an assignment of an attorney to "kiddie
court." Providing effective assistance of counsel to children accused
of delinquency requires lawyers to evaluate realistically what is going
on in these courts and to protect their clients just as they would in a
typical adult criminal court. The attorney needs to understand her
role. She is not a guardian ad litem, appointed by the court to seek
the "best interests of the child." She is an advocate. Instead of pan-
dering to the supposed benevolence of the kiddie court-telling the
child-client what to do, betraying confidential information, spending
insufficient time on the case and with the client-she should protect
her client by embracing a model, which I call "holistic lawyering."33
Holistic lawyering, in part, is based on my experience as a public
defender representing children accused of crime in Solano County,
California. 4 I also base this model on my many years as a public
school teacher and administrator. Holistic lawyering embodies the
quality of legal representation that is necessary to assure that alleged
delinquents receive the true right to counsel that the Court in Gault
intended to grant. 5
At one extreme of the effective assistance of counsel for children
spectrum, there exists an aspirational and concededly idealistic ap-
proach to holistic lawyering that requires high levels of funding and
CRIME: THE REPORT OF THE NATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE COMMISSION 130 (Steven R.
Donziger ed., 1996) [hereinafter THE REAL WAR ON CRIME] (noting the prison-like condi-
tions in juvenile correction facilities).
30. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (providing that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy .. . the Assistance of Counsel for his defence").
31. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
32. Id. at 30-31. In 1966, one year before its decision in In re Gault, the Court, in Kent v.
United States, held that children subject to waiver proceedings are entitled to the assistance
of counsel, access to probation files, as well as a right to a hearing and statement of reasons
for the waiver order. Kent, 383 U.S. 541, 561 (1966).
33. Prior to Gault, juvenile court judges did not welcome lawyers in their courtrooms.
See Barry C. Feld, The Right to Counsel in Juvenile Court: An Empirical Study of Wen Lawyers
Appear and the Difference They Make, 79J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1185, 1192 (1989) (noting
that juvenile court judges were hostile to lawyers in juvenile proceedings because they "re-
garded lawyers as both irrelevant and an impediment to their 'childsaving' mission").
34. I worked in the conflict office in Solano County. It had two public defender of-
fices: the primary one, which took all indigent children accused of crime, and a separate
conflict office. The latter would be appointed in all cases in which the primary public
defender office declared a conflict, typically arising from children acting in concert.
35. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 34-42 (describing a juvenile's right to counsel).
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resources, cooperation with non-legal experts, and perhaps even most
importantly, new attitudes regarding zealous advocacy in the juvenile
justice system. At the other end of the spectrum is the kind of pater-
nalistic lawyering that tends to be the norm in juvenile court, where
the attorney acts more as a guardian ad litem than as a zealous advo-
cate.3 6 The latter approach is all too prevalent, it reveals a fundamen-
tal ignorance of the juvenile justice system, and it ignores the
consequences imposed upon the children enmeshed within this sys-
tem. Lawyering in juvenile courts is a fine art-one that is in tension
with the myth of beneficence and the shibboleth "best interests of the
child,"3 7 at least as these terms are commonly interpreted.3"
In this Article, I explain the importance of high quality, zealous
advocacy for children accused of crime in juvenile court, and what it
takes to provide such professional services. In Part I, I explore the
right to counsel granted by the Gault Court, the various stages ofjuve-
nile delinquency proceedings to which the right to counsel could the-
oretically apply, and how determinations of indigency and waiver
along with the interference of parents can effectively undermine the
due process right to counsel afforded in Gault. In Part II, I analyze
the different views of counsel's function in juvenile court-usually ex-
pressed in the mutually exclusive terms of zealous advocacy versus best
interests. In this section, I conclude that that dichotomy is false or at
least misleading in-as-much as zealous advocacy is in the child's best
interests. In Part III, I develop my model of holistic lawyering, and
describe how it plays out in the ideal and real worlds. Finally, I offer
suggestions for attorneys who represent offenders in juvenile court.
36. New York was a leader in providing defense counsel for children in juvenile court.
However, the statute denominates defense attorneys merely as law guardians, see N.Y. FAM.
CT. Acr § 320.2(2) (McKinney 1999) (requiring the court to appoint a law guardian to
represent the juveniles at the initial appearance), and misses the true role of appointed
counsel for juveniles as envisioned by the Gault Court, see In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 34-42
(describing a juvenile's right to counsel).
37. See JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 65-67
(1979) (discussing the many conflicting pressures, approaches, and goals that relate to the
representation of child-clients); see also Kent, 383 U.S. at 554-57 (describing a number of
peculiarities in the juvenile justice system devised to assist children, which nevertheless in
many ways deprive children of constitutional rights and increasingly complicate their
representation).
38. See GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 37, at 66 (arguing that state child welfare agencies,
parents, relatives, and the like may declare benevolent intentions, yet do not and cannot
"have a conflict-free interest in representing [a] child").
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I. THE PROMISE AND THE REALITY OF IN RE GAULT'S RIGHT
TO COUNSEL
A. In re Gault's Promise: The Due Process Right to Counsel
It was not until 1967 that the United States Supreme Court
granted children accused of committing criminal acts the right to
counsel in the adjudicatory guilt-innocence stage of delinquency pro-
ceedings. "9 Gault was a major conceptual breakthrough.4" Previously,
states denied constitutional protections to children in juvenile court
through the parens patriae doctrine and the civil labeling of delin-
quency proceedings, which the Supreme Court finally rejected in
Gault.
4 1
The Court, although viewing the delinquency adjudication as
"comparable in seriousness to a felony prosecution, '42 granted the
right to counsel as a matter of due process rather than as the explicit
Sixth Amendment guarantee of assistance of counsel.4 3 Indeed, the
only Bill of Rights guarantee specifically applied to delinquency hear-
ings was the privilege against self-incrimination. 44 The other constitu-
tional protections granted by Gault's holding-notice,4 5 counsel,
46
39. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 30-31. However, the Court carefully limited the scope of its
holding. See id. at 31 n.48 (stating that "what we hold in this opinion with regard to the
procedural requirements at the adjudicatory stage has no necessary applicability to other
steps of the juvenile process").
40. In addition to the majority opinion authored by Justice Fortas, four other justices
issued opinions. Justice White, addressing the breadth of Gault, argued that the Court
should not have resolved either the Fifth Amendment issue, or the cross-examination and
confrontation claims. Id. at 65 (White, J., concurring). Justice Harlan argued that due
process only required the right to notice, counsel, and a written record that would permit
adequate appellate or collateral review. Id. at 72 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part). He did not believe that the privilege against self-incrimination or the
rights to confrontation and cross-examination were constitutionally necessary in such pro-
ceedings. Id. at 74. Justice Black argued that either a child or adult charged with violating
a criminal law and committed for six years, should be afforded all the guarantees of the Bill
of Rights. Id. at 61 (Black, J., concurring). In addition, Justice Black viewed the denial of
the constitutional safeguards provided by the Bill of Rights to children as violating equal
protection of the law. Id. Finally, Justice Stewart argued that the constitutionalization of
juvenile courts might cause states to abandon special forums created to benefit children.
Id. at 79-80 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
41. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 16-18, 49-50. The Court noted that "[t]he absence of proce-
dural rules based upon constitutional principle has not always produced fair, efficient, and
effective procedures. Departures from established principles of due process have fre-
quently resulted not in enlightened procedure, but in arbitrariness." Id. at 18-19.
42. Id. at 36.
43. Id. at 41. But see id. at 64 (Black, J., concurring) (contending that the Arizona law
should not be invalidated because it is "unfair," but rather because "it violates the Fifth and
Sixth Amendments").
44. In re Gault, 307 U.S. at 55.
45. Id. at 33-34.
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cross-examination,4 7  and confrontation 48-rest on Fourteenth
Amendment due process notions of fundamental fairness rather than
on the specific provisions relating to those rights in the Sixth
Amendment.4 9
The way the Court formerly differentiated between the appoint-
ment of counsel for adults charged with crimes in state court and in
federal court exemplifies the distinction between the due process and
the Sixth Amendment rights to counsel. Prior to incorporation of the
Sixth Amendment's attorney provision in 1963,50 an indigent defen-
dant's right to appointed counsel in state court derived solely from
the concepts of due process and fundamental fairness.5 1 These con-
cepts were limited, unfortunately, and meant such defendants were
only entitled to an appointed counsel if there were special circum-
stances.52 The undiluted Sixth Amendment right to counsel governed
indigent defendants in federal court, automatically assigning an attor-
ney in every felony case. 53 Following Gideon v. Wainwright,54 however,
indigent defendants charged with felonies in state court were also au-
tomatically entitled to the appointment of counsel. 55 Thus, incorpo-
46. Id. at 41.
47. Id. at 57.
48. Id. at 56.
49. See Barry C. Feld, CriminalizingJuvenileJustice: Rules of Procedure for the Juvenile Court,
69 MINN. L. REv. 141, 151-64 (1984); Irene Merker Rosenberg, The Constitutional Rights of
Children Charged with Crime: Proposal for a Return to the Not So Distant Past, 27 UCLA L. REv.
656, 665-73 (1980) (discussing the constitutional bases for the Gault holding).
50. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342-43 (1963) (incorporating the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel into the Fourteenth Amendment).
51. See Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 473 (1942) (finding that the Due Process Clause of
the "Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the conviction and incarceration of one whose trial
is offensive to the common and fundamental ideas of fairness and right"), overruled by
Gideon, 372 U.S. at 339.
52. See id. at 472-73 (discussing the reasons for not declaring a blanket right to counsel
rule). The Court looked to such factors as the possible length of sentence, the complexity
of the charges, and the defendant's ability to represent himself. Id. at 473. In death pen-
alty cases, however, many states gave an absolute right to counsel, since death itself was
viewed as an exceptional circumstance. Id. at 469-70; see also Hamilton v. Alabama, 368
U.S. 52, 54-55 (1961) (holding that capital defendants were absolutely entitled to counsel
at arraignment hearings); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 58 (1932) (holding that defend-
ants in a capital case were entitled to receive substantive assistance of counsel).
53. Betts, 316 U.S. at 461. In Betts, the Court rejected the defendant's argument that
due process requires the state to supply counsel in all state criminal prosecutions. Id. at
464, 473.
54. 372 U.S. 335.
55. Id. at 339, 342-43 (overruling Betts by incorporating the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel into the Fourteenth Amendment).
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ration of the Sixth Amendment into the Fourteenth Amendment
made the right to counsel in state and federal courts coextensive.5 6
One may, however, take the position that a delinquent's due pro-
cess right to counsel is not coterminous with an adult defendant's
Sixth Amendment right to counsel in criminal proceedings. Such a
position supports the view that counsel in juvenile court functions as a
guardian ad litem as opposed to a zealous advocate. The argument
that the due process right to counsel in delinquency proceedings is of
a lesser potency than the Sixth Amendment right to counsel in crimi-
nal cases may also be supported by the assertion that minority status
justifies diminished constitutional protection. 58 For example, the
Court takes an analogous approach when it uses strict scrutiny for gov-
ernment restrictions on the privacy rights of adults, but only interme-
diate scrutiny when the subjects are children. 59  The Court
rationalizes this distinction because of children's supposed immatur-
56. Furthermore, in Duncan v. Louisiana, the Court held that the Sixth Amendment
right to a jury trial applied to the states because it was a fundamental right in the Anglo-
American system of justice incorporated into the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 391 U.S. 145, 148-56 (1968).
57. In Middendorf v. Henry, the Court held that because summary court-martials were
not criminal, there was no constitutional right to counsel, either as a matter of due process
or the Sixth Amendment. 425 U.S. 25, 42 (1976). The majority distinguished Middendorf
from Gault on the ground that the right to counsel granted in Gault was a due process
right, rather than a Sixth Amendment right. Id. at 37. Justice Marshall, dissenting, argued
there was still a right to counsel in delinquency cases, even if it was a due process right as
opposed to a Sixth Amendment right. Id. at 60-61 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Part of the difficulty in applying the Sixth Amendment right to counsel to delinquency
proceedings is that such cases are denominated civil in nature, and the Sixth Amendment
requires a criminal proceeding. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI (limiting the right to counsel to
criminal cases).
58. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 634-36 (1979) (plurality) (recognizing that there are
"three reasons justifying the conclusion that the constitutional rights of children cannot be
equated with those of adults: the peculiar vulnerability of children; their inability to make
critical decisions in an informed, mature manner; and the importance of the parental role
in child rearing"); see also Parham v.J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979) (discussing the historical
recognition "that natural bonds of affection lead parents to act in the best interests of their
children").
59. Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 689-90, 693 (1977) (plurality opinion
in part) (using strict scrutiny to invalidate a law limiting the distribution of contraceptives
to adults and only intermediate scrutiny for the ban on distribution of contraceptives to
children). Cf Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 664-65 (1995) (finding a
"decreased expectation of privacy" for children and upholding a public school district rule
that student athletes were required to undergo random urinalysis). In his majority opin-
ion, Justice Scalia appeared to be using intermediate scrutiny rather than strict scrutiny
and stressed the fact that the schools' power over children is "custodial and tutelary." Id. at
656.
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ity, vulnerability, lack of decision-making ability, and because they "are
always in some form of custody. "60
Paradoxically, a strong argument can be made simultaneously
that children's immaturity should entitle them to more rather than less
constitutional protection.6 The Gault Court's use of the Fourteenth
Amendment due process analysis, with its emphasis on fundamental
fairness, suggests that the right to counsel granted by Gault may be
read even more expansively than an adult's Sixth Amendment right to
counsel.62 Indeed, the reasons the Court gives for restricting chil-
dren's constitutional rights-their developmental deficits and lack of
wisdom-also justify enhanced constitutional protection for minors.63
For example, to assure that courts treat alleged delinquents in a fun-
damentally fair way, one might conclude that the child's right to coun-
sel in delinquency proceedings must help overcome or compensate
for the minor's competency differentials.64 The deficiencies that chil-
dren present in a criminal context, such as their impulsive decision-
making, their inability to fully comprehend the intricacies of the law,
their memory perceptions, and their inarticulateness, make it difficult
to assure a level of representation that comports with notions of fun-
damental fairness.65
60. Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 265 (1984).
61. Gary B. Melton, Taking Gault Seriously: Toward a New Juvenile Court, 68 NEB. L. REV.
146, 172 (1989).
62. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 30-31 (1967). Justice Harlan wrote:
Surely this illustrates that prudence and the principles of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment alike require that the Court should now impose no more procedural restric-
tions than are imperative to assure fundamental fairness, and that the States
should instead be permitted additional opportunities to develop without unneces-
sary hindrance their systems of juvenile courts.
Id. at 76 (Harlan, J., concurring).
63. Justice Brennan has argued that children committed to state mental hospitals by
their parents may be entitled to greater constitutional protection than adults because:
The consequences of an erroneous commitment decision are more tragic where
children are involved. Children, on the average, are confined for longer periods
than are adults. Moreover, childhood is a particularly vulnerable time of life and
children erroneously institutionalized during their formative years may bear the
scars for the rest of their lives.
Parham, 442 U.S. at 627-28 (Brennan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (footnotes
omitted).
64. See Rosenberg, supra note 49, at 659 (stating that "one might question why, in view
of age and competency differentials, the child is given less protection rather than more
[protection]").
65. See Melton, supra note 61, at 153-67 (explaining why mental differences between
children and adults require the state to give children in delinquency proceedings more
constitutional protection than adults in criminal cases).
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In addition to competency differences, children's sense of time is
also markedly different from that of adults. 66 Asking a child where he
was two weeks ago is like asking an adult where he was two years ago
on a Thursday afternoon in March.67 Similarly, consider explaining
the Miranda6 8 warnings and their implications to a ten-year-old child
and preparing the child to testify at a suppression hearing.69 Studies
show that almost all minors fail to comprehend the Miranda warnings
even when they are broken down and explained in simple, child-
friendly terms.70 How then will the child be able to explain to the
court what happened at the police station, and his or her lack of un-
derstanding of the warnings? Indeed, after Gault, several jurisdictions,
using state law, provided enhanced Miranda protection by requiring a
parent or attorney to be present when a child waived his or her
rights.
7 1
However, the question remains as to what kind of lawyering
would assure fundamental fairness for the child in a delinquency pro-
ceeding. The age range for children accused of crime usually runs
from seven to seventeen. 72 A ten-year range is enormous when deal-
66. GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 37, at 41 (finding that a child judges the passage of
time by his or her own "subjective feelings of impatience and frustration").
67. See id. at 40 (explaining that adults can cope with intervals of time but children
experience them based on "their instinctual and emotional needs").
68. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
69. Although Miranda is, of course, a Fifth Amendment rather than a Sixth Amend-
ment case, the decision did create a limited right to counsel to protect the privilege against
self-incrimination. Id. at 469. The Court has never explicitly applied Miranda to delin-
quency cases; however, the Gault opinion spoke of the unreliability of confessions by chil-
dren and limited its holding regarding the privilege against self-incrimination to in-court
admissions. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 56-57 (1967). In Fare v. Michael C., the Court deter-
mined that the minor's request to speak with his probation officer did not constitute a per
se invocation of Miranda. 442 U.S. 707, 727-28 (1979). The Court observed that it had
never "held that Miranda applies with full force to exclude evidence obtained in violation
of its proscriptions from consideration in juvenile proceedings." Id. at 717 n.4. The Court
went on to "assume without deciding that the Miranda principles were fully applicable to
the present proceedings." Id.
70. See Thomas Grisso, Juveniles' Capacities to Waive Miranda Rights: An Empirical Analysis,
68 CAL. L. REv. 1134, 1160-66 (1980) (arguing for a per se exclusionary rule for Miranda
waivers by juveniles).
71. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-2-511(1) (West 1999) (requiring a parent to be
present when the juvenile is advised of her Miranda rights in order for a statement or
admission from a custodial interrogation to be admissible); N.Y. FAM. CT. Acr § 305.2(7)
(McKinney 1999) (asserting that a child may not be questioned unless a parent or guard-
ian is present and both parties are advised of the minor's rights); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.
§ 51.09 (Vernon 2002) (stating that a child waiving any right must be accompanied by an
attorney and the waiver must be informed and voluntary).
72. As noted above, the maximum age for delinquency is generally seventeen. See, e.g.,
ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 8-201(10) (West 1999 & Supp. 2001) (defining a "delinquent act"
as an act that can only be committed by a person under the age of eighteen). States often
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ing with children.7" The difference between a child of seven and sev-
enteen is far greater than the difference between thirty- and forty-year-
olds.7 4 Factor in the reality that many children, in juvenile court suffer
from a host of emotional7 5 and physical problems,7 6 come from dys-
functional and poor families,7 7 and have educational deficits,78 and
one can see how an attorney faces a formidable task.
I have dealt with children in many capacities: as a teacher from
pre-school through high school, as an administrator, and as an attor-
ney, and I am skilled at getting children to relate to me. Notwith-
standing considerable training and experience, representing children
in juvenile court is difficult. Many children do not know what a lawyer
indicate a minimum age a child must be to be charged with delinquency. See, e.g., N.Y.
Soc. SERv. LAW § 371(5) (McKinney 1992) (stating that a "juvenile delinquent" is a child
over the age of seven and under the age of sixteen charged with committing an act that
would be considered a crime if committed by an adult). But see FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 985.03(6) (West Supp. 2002) (defining a juvenile as a child under the age of eighteen
who committed a violation of law and not stating any lower age limits).
At common law, children under the age of seven were irrebutably presumed incapable
of entertaining mens rea. See Andrew Walkover, The Infancy Defense in the New Juvenile Court,
31 UCLA L. REv. 503, 510 (1984) (explaining that at common law "[c]hildren under the
age of seven were conclusively presumed to be incapable of taking responsibility for their
acts"). Between the ages of seven and fourteen, there was a "rebuttable presumption of
incapacity." Id. at 511. From the age of fourteen upwards, it was presumed that the child
was competent to commit a criminal act. Id. at 510-11. See generally A.W.G. Kean, The His-
tory of the Criminal Liability of Children, 53 LAw Q. REV. 364 (1937) (discussing the common
law presumption of infancy).
73. Jean Piaget classifies the developmental process into five primary periods. HENRY
W. MAIER, THREE THEORIES OF CHILD DEVELOPMENT: THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF ERIK H. ERIK-
SON, JEAN PIAGET, AND ROBERT R. SEARS, AND THEIR APPLICATIONS 103 (1969). The first
period includes children from birth to one and a half to two years of age. Id. Preconcep-
tual (from ages two to four) is the second period, intuitive thought (from ages four to
seven) is the third, concrete operations (from ages seven to eleven) is fourth, and the last
period is formal operations covering eleven- through fifteen-year-olds. Id. at 118, 125, 136,
146. The breakdown between the age groups is narrow because the developmental process
of children varies greatly. Id. at 101-02.
74. It is generally accepted that the most formative years are childhood and adoles-
cence. See id. at 29 (describing individual development as a series of phases from birth
through adolescence).
75. Child abuse, neglect, and emotional abuse are leading factors that contribute to
juvenile delinquency. SeeJane Watson, Crime and Juvenile Delinquency Prevention Policy: Time
for Early Childhood Intervention, 2 GEO. J. ON FIGHTING POVERTY 245, 247 (1995).
76. Poverty can cause children to have many more physical ailments as they grow up
since they are not likely to receive proper health care or immunizations. IRA M. SCHWARTZ,
(IN)JusTICE FORJUVENILES: RETHINKING THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 178 (1989).
77. More crime occurs in low income neighborhoods and poverty can have a negative
impact on family life. THE REAL WAR ON CRIME, supra note 29, at 28.
78. While children in public schools with learning disabilities only make up 8.6% of
the population, one study indicated that 70% of incarcerated youth, have a disabling con-
dition. See Sue Burrell & Loren Warboys, Special Education and the Juvenile Justice System, Juv.
JUST. BULL., July 2000, at 1.
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is or does.79 They cannot easily differentiate between the attorney
and other officials in the juvenile court system.8" They have no sense
of how that system works,8' and they have enormous difficulty remem-
bering and adhering to instructions. For example, I represented a
fourteen-year-old charged with the crime of escape. Although he was
going to plead guilty to that charge, I warned him not to talk to anyone
about what may have happened after his escape, as it might lead to
additional charges. He failed to follow my advice and told one of the
guards in the detention facility (it was unclear who initiated the con-
versation) that he had been involved in the rape and murder of a
fifteen-year-old girl after his escape from a residential treatment
center. The guard, of course, repeated his inculpatory statement to
prosecutors, and it was used as evidence at the child's adjudicatory
hearing for the rape and murder. If the child had been an adult, the
inculpatory statement would also be admissible since the statement
related to an as yet uncharged offense, and therefore, government
officials could initiate interrogation about that offense without coun-
sel's presence, as long as Miranda warnings were given.8 2 Considering
children's developmental, intellectual, and emotional immaturity, one
79. Cf Emily Buss, "You're My What?" The Problem of Children's Misperceptions of Their
Lawyers' Roles, 64 FORDHAM L. REv. 1699, 1706-11 (1996) (discussing the misconception
children have of their lawyers' role in child dependency proceedings). Professor Buss at-
tributes part of this confusion to the attorney's own view of her role in representing a
juvenile in dependency proceedings. Id. at 1712. Should the attorney represent the
child's wishes or the child's best interests? Id. at 1699. Although she likens the role attor-
neys should take in delinquency proceedings to the traditional role of advocate, she ac-
knowledges that children are still often confused about the attorney's role partially because
of the lawyer's actions and partially because of the child's own perception of the proceed-
ings. Id. at 1711; see also Ellen Marrus, Please Keep My Secret: Child Abuse Reporting Statutes,
Confidentiality, and Juvenile Delinquency, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHics 509, 515-20 (1998) (discuss-
ing the various roles attorneys take in delinquency proceedings).
80. See Buss, supra note 79, at 1706-11 (discussing children's limited knowledge ofjudi-
cial proceedings). Professor Buss does note, however, that extensive age appropriate com-
munication between attorney and client can be useful tools to help the child-client develop
an understanding of the legal system. Id.
81. See id. at 1706-07 (offering suggestions to attorneys as to how to meet, interact, and
work with a child-client).
82. McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 177-79 (1991) (authorizing questioning after
Miranda warnings were given and waived, without the presence of an attorney, to an un-
charged offense). Under Minnick v. Mississippi, once a defendant has invoked his right to
counsel, the police cannot initiate interrogation unless defendant's counsel is present. 498
U.S. 146, 153 (1990). In McNei the Court held that the defendant's invocation of his
Sixth Amendment right to counsel by appearing with his attorney at a bail hearing does
not also constitute an invocation of the Fifth Amendment right to counsel. 501 U.S. at 178-
79. Therefore, the Sixth Amendment prohibits police initiated questioning without coun-
sel for the crime for which he is charged, but the police may still question the defendant
about unrelated and uncharged crimes without counsel's presence. Id. at 176-77.
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might argue, however, that statements taken from a child in custody
whose counsel was not present at the time should not be admissible
even with respect to an uncharged offense.8 3 Such a rule would as-
sure fundamental fairness and protect the child's right to counsel as
well as his privilege against self-incrimination. Concededly, this inter-
pretation is more than what adults receive, but it is necessary to fully
protect the child and give him or her the equivalent protection ac-
corded to adults. To illustrate this point, in the case described above,
an adult had also been involved in the rape and murder. My client
informed me that the adult was the primary actor in the offense, a
position that was consistent with his earlier statement to the guard.
The adult spoke only with his lawyer, and arranged for a plea bargain
based on his assertion that the juvenile was the primary culprit. The
adult was sentenced to three years in prison, while my client was com-
mitted for the maximum term of ten years.8 4
B. The Reality: The Stages of Juvenile Delinquency Proceedings and the
Right to Counsel
In order to fully understand what holistic lawyering entails, we
need to look at the different stages of a delinquency proceeding-
intake, detention, adjudication, disposition, revocation, placement re-
view, placement extension and appeal 8 5-and examine how counsel's
representation can affect the child. The Gault Court spoke only to the
adjudicatory hearing, at which guilt or innocence of a penal offense is
determined. 6 Most jurisdictions, however, have as a matter of state
83. The Gault Court wrote:
If counsel was not present for some permissible reason when an admission was
obtained, the greatest care must be taken to assure that the admission was volun-
tary, in the sense not only that it was not coerced or suggested, but also that it was
not the product of ignorance of rights or of adolescent fantasy, fright or despair.
387 U.S. 1, 55 (1967).
84. In many cases, children in juvenile court are subjected to longer periods of incar-
ceration than adults for committing the same offense. Barry C. Feld, The Juvenile Court
Meets the Principle of Offense: Punishment, Treatment, and the Difference It Makes, 68 B.U. L. REv.
821, 837 (1988). For example, in Gault, the Court noted that had Gerald been an adult,
the maximum punishment would have been a fine of between five to fifty dollars or up to
two months imprisonment. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 29. His sentence in juvenile court was a
commitment of six years. Id.
85. I am not discussing waiver hearings, which are governed by Kent, see 383 U.S. 541,
543 (1966), even though such cases may start out as delinquency proceedings. A district
attorney must elect whether to proceed with a case as a delinquency matter or request a
waiver hearing. See Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 541 (1975) (holding that juveniles who
have been subjected to an adjudicatory hearing in juvenile court may not, as a matter of
double jeopardy, be tried for that same offense in criminal court).
86. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 31 n.48. Although most commentators view the Gault
decision as applicable only to children charged with the commission of a criminal act, it is
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law, extended the right to counsel to dispositional hearings where the
"sentence" is imposed."7 Representation at the other stages is much
less frequent.88 Nonetheless, the lack of legal representation at these
other proceedings has an enormous impact on children in the system.
Intake probation officers often determine whether to refer al-
leged delinquents to court or to divert them to community based
agencies.8 9 Whether a child is referred to court depends on a variety
possible to read the case as applying also to status offenders-children who allegedly vio-
lated reasonable and lawful commands of their parents. These actions generally involve
noncriminal conduct such as running away from home, truancy, and curfew violations.
Irene Merker Rosenberg & Yale L. Rosenberg, The Legacy of the Stubborn and Rebellious Son,
74 MICH. L. REv. 1097, 1121-22 n.118 (1976).
This is an important issue because the distinction between delinquents and status of-
fenders is often elusive. Some states define a delinquent as a criminal law violator or one
who has violated probation rules, including an order of probation imposed on status of-
fenders. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-5-103(11) (Supp. 2002). In many such states,
counsel will be provided for the probationer because the probation violations determine
the status of delinquency for which Gault requires counsel, even though the child is not
being charged with a penal law violation. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-5-331 (1) (a)
(2000) (noting that a youth must be apprised of his or her right to counsel if the youth is
taken into custody for questioning that could lead to a delinquency petition). In some
states, courts accomplish the same result by viewing the probation violation as akin to crim-
inal contempt. L.A.M. v. State, 547 P.2d 827, 832 (Alaska 1976). But see In re Spalding, 332
A.2d 246, 256-57 (Md. 1975) (holding that Gault did not apply where a girl was adjudicated
as a child in need of supervision, even though the underlying acts were criminal). Thus, to
obviate Gault, children charged with criminal conduct could simply be charged as status
offenders.
87. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 700 (West 1998) (requiring that a juvenile have
counsel at a dispositional hearing); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 985.203 (West 2001) (stating that a
child is entitled to the assistance of counsel at all stages of delinquency proceedings); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 232.11 (1) (e) (West 2000) (requiring that ajuvenile have counsel at a disposi-
tional hearing).
88. Adult defendants are granted counsel at preliminary hearings but juveniles are
generally not. See, e.g., In re Frank H., 337 N.Y.S.2d 118, 124 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1972) (holding
that because New York law prohibits the use of any statements made during the juvenile's
intake conference at the adjudicatory hearing, there was no necessity for extending the
right of counsel to the intake level); see also infta notes 92-94 and accompanying text. Most
states do not provide counsel for juveniles at detention hearings. See, e.g., Arbogast v.
R.B.C., 301 S.E.2d 827, 828 (W. Va. 1983) (per curiam) (holding that a juvenile does not
have an absolute right to counsel at detention hearings). Some states require that
juveniles have counsel at parole revocation hearings. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 62A-7-
112(3) (2000) (stating that "[a] paroled youth offender is entitled to legal representation
at the parole revocation hearing, and if the youth offender or his family has requested but
cannot afford legal representation, the authority shall appoint legal counsel"); see also infra
note 121 and accompanying text. Few states provide juveniles with counsel at the appellate
stage. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-1606(b) (2000) (specifying that ajuvenile is entitled to
an attorney at appeal); see also infra note 130 and accompanying text.
89. In some jurisdictions, prosecutors make the ultimate charging decision and the
intake probation officer merely provides the necessary information. See TEX. FAM. CODE
ANN. § 53.012(a) (Vernon 2002) (stating that "[t]he prosecuting attorney shall promptly
review the circumstances and allegations of a referral .. . for legal sufficiency and the
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of factors including: admission of guilt, evidence of guilt, seriousness
of the offense, prior record, school attendance, and home environ-
ment.9" It is in effect a dispositional hearing at the front end, and if
one values representation at the latter stage, it would be just as valua-
ble at intake.9 Alternatively, the intake process could be viewed as a
preliminary hearing, which for criminal defendants is a "critical stage"
of the proceedings requiring the appointment of counsel for indi-
gents.9 2 Furthermore, any information gathered at the intake level is
often used by probation officers for detention and dispositional rec-
ommendations and may be relayed to prosecutors. 93 These condi-
desirability of prosecution"); TEX. FAm. CODE ANN. § 53.01 (a) (requiring that "[o]n refer-
ral of a person believed to be a child or on referral of the person's case to the office ... the
intake officer . . . shall conduct a preliminary investigation"). In other states, it is the
probation department that makes the charging determination. See, e.g., N.Y. FAM. CT. Acr
§ 320.6(1) (McKinney 1999) (providing that "the probation service shall make a recom-
mendation to the court at the initial appearance regarding the suitability of adjusting the
case").
90. FLA. STAT. AINN. § 985.21 (1)(a) (West 2002); see N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 308.1(6) (Mc-
Kinney 1999) (stating that the probation service may include in their report to the present-
ment agency any previous adjustments or arrests).
In In re Charles C., the court explained the value of intake probation in the following
terms:
Probation intake is a hallmark of the juvenile justice system. Its purpose is to
screen from the Court those youngsters who, because of age, lack of prior record,
good adjustment at home and in the community or other factors could derive no
benefit from court involvement and, indeed, might be damaged by it. Adjust-
ment at probation intake also is a device to shield an overburdened Family Court
from those cases which do not require court action. The benefits of diversion, in a
proper case, to child and community alike, are unquestioned.
371 N.Y.S.2d 582, 585 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1975) (footnotes omitted).
91. See Feld, supra note 84, at 882-83 n.310 (finding that "[r]ecent research indicates
that the decision making process is cumulative; decisions made by the initial partici-
pants-police or intake-affect the types of decisions made by subsequent participants");
cf Harris v. Procunier, 498 F.2d. 576, 585-86 (9th Cir. 1974) (Hufstedler, J., dissenting)
(analyzing the waiver determination as analogous to a sentencing proceeding in criminal
court and mandating that Kent's counsel requirement be retroactive).
92. Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1970) (plurality); Hamilton v. Alabama, 368
U.S. 52, 54 (1961).
93. See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 734(e) (McKinney 1999) (providing that statements made
during an intake conference cannot be used at an adjudicatory hearing but implicitly al-
lowing such information to be used at other hearings). But see TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.
§ 53.03(c) (Vernon 2002) (holding that incriminating statements made at the intake con-
ference "may not be used against the declarant in any court hearing"). Even if there are
prohibitions against using evidence obtained during an intake conference, such evidence
may well play a role in probation recommendations regarding detention and commitment.
See Feld, supra note 84, at 882 n.310 (discussing a number of role players in the disposi-
tional decision of a juvenile, all of which possess vast amounts of discretion in what evi-
dence to consider and what decision to make).
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tions make the presence of counsel a necessity rather than a luxury.
Nonetheless, the right to counsel at intake is a rarity.94
Detention hearings decide whether the child is to be released or
remanded to a juvenile facility, and are thus akin to bail hearings at
which defendants in criminal court have the right to legal representa-
tion. 5 Detention affects the ability of the attorney to gather informa-
tion and can be harmful to the child's development, even assuming
the remand facility is safe.9 6 Additionally, a child who is detained is
more likely to be adjudicated a delinquent than one who is returned
home and is more likely to be placed in a locked facility at disposi-
94. See In reFrank H., 337 N.Y.S.2d 118, 124 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1972) (holding that because
New York law prohibits the use of any statements made during the intake conference at the
adjudicatory hearing, there was no necessity for extending the right of counsel to the in-
take level).
95. Moore v. Illinois, 434 U.S. 220, 231-32 (1977) (finding that a preliminary hearing
to set bail was a critical stage in the adversarial process requiring the presence of defen-
dant's counsel). The Sixth Amendment right to counsel for adult defendants is applicable
only after initiation ofjudicial adversarial proceedings and only at critical stages. Kirby v.
Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 690 (1972).
Most states conclude thatjuveniles are not entitled to bail, in part because children do
not have contractual capacity to enter into bail agreements, and in part because the statu-
tory detention criteria in juvenile statutes favors release of the child to his parents. See
Fulwood v. Stone, 394 F.2d 939, 943 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (refusing to reach the question of
whether there is a constitutional right to bail in juvenile proceedings because of statutory
preference for release of the child); Doe v. State, 487 P.2d 47, 52 (Alaska 1971) (holding
bail to be inappropriate for juveniles).
96. One court described a particular New York City juvenile detention facility in the
following way:
The building is surrounded by a high wall. Although individual sleeping rooms
are left open at night unless the particular child poses a risk to himself or others,
the children (boys) are otherwise locked in their dormitories, recreation rooms
or classrooms .... Each corridor of the building that leads to the dormitories,
classrooms, dining halls or offices has metal doors at each end that are locked at
all times. An electronically locked metal door controls movement in and out of
the buildings. The windows are secured from inside by a screen made of institu-
tional netting.
[S]pace for receiving children is inadequate so that searching is often
conducted in the toilet facilities; there is lack of sufficient area for visitation; the
school is divided among three separate floors, creating "traffic problems"; light-
ing is "generally inadequate", the rooms are often cold in winter, and the fire
alarm system-at least at the date of the report-was in disrepair.
In addition to being locked institutions (internally and externally) whose
male "inmates" must wear uniform clothing, there are other characteristics which
the centers share with penal institutions .... [C]hildren are required to walk in
line from place to place without talking, and are "hit" or have a smoking break
taken away if they get out of line. Knives are not generally furnished at meals.
Homosexuality, both forced and consensual, exists in both girls' and boys' centers
as what all parties appear to agree is an inevitable concomitant of incarceration.
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tion.17 However, the right to counsel at detention hearings is becom-
ing more widespread, but as of yet, is not universal.98
Adjudicatory hearings settle whether a child committed the al-
leged criminal acts, and is, except for the lack of a jury in most juris-
dictions, 9 akin to adult criminal trials. The court considers whether
there is proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the person charged
committed a violation of the penal law." 0  Of course, Gault makes rep-
resentation at this stage constitutionally mandatory. 1 As we will see,
At the time of trial [the] Center had available only the per diem (part time)
services of one psychiatrist .... [c]ommitted to serve a minimum of ten hours
weekly....
• . . "Psychiatric coverage for the detention centers, based upon the present
population (which is not expected to increase) should at a minimum equal two
full-time psychiatrists (70 hours per week) with provision for emergency consulta-
tion on nights, weekends and holidays (an additional 12-15 hours per month)."
Martarella v. Kelley, 349 F. Supp. 575, 580-87 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), enforced, 359 F. Supp. 478
(S.D.N.Y. 1973) (citations omitted). See also Feld, supra note 49, at 200-01 n.197 (finding
that "[t]he conditions described at Spofford [detention facility] are endemic to juvenile
detention facilities around the nation").
97. See Feld, supra note 33, at 1337-38 (discussing the "negative effects of pretrial deten-
tion on subsequent sentencing"). It should be noted, however, that children who are de-
tained may be more dangerous than other children, and thus may be more likely to receive
a harsher sentence.
98. See Arbogast v. R.B.C., 301 S.E.2d 827, 828 (W. Va. 1983) (per curiam) (holding
that a juvenile does not have an absolute right to counsel at detention hearings); ToryJ.
Caeti et al., Juvenile Right to Counsel: A National Comparison of State Legal Codes, 23 AM. J.
CRiM. L. 611, 616 (1996) (noting that state courts have individually interpreted the right to
counsel granted under Gault, and as a result, some states have granted juveniles more
procedural safeguards, while others have granted less).
99. In McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, Justice Blackmun noted that there were ten states at
that time that granted the right to jury trials in juvenile court as a matter of state law. 403
U.S. 528, 549 (1971) (plurality). Most of those states have continued to grant delinquents
the right to a jury trial. See Irene Merker Rosenberg, A Door Left Open: Applicability of the
Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule to Juvenile Court Delinquency Hearings, 24 AM. J. CRuM. L.
29, 60 (1996) (noting that states have ignored the McKeiver ruling and have maintained or
even added a juvenile's right to a jury trial). How often that ight is exercised is another
matter. See TEx. APPLESEED FAIR DEF. PROJECT ON INDIGENT DEE. PRACTICES IN TEX.-JUVE-
NILE CHAPTER, SELLING JUSTICE SHORT: JUVENILE INDIGENT DEFENSE IN TEXAS 21 (2000)
[hereinafter SELLING JUSTICE SHORT] (finding that "there is an unwritten rule that you
don't request ajury except in murder or sexual assault cases. Some attorneys won't ask for
juries at all because they are worried that they won't get appointments." (internal quota-
tion marks omitted)); see also Barry C. Feld, Will the Juvenile Court System Survive?: The Honest
Politician's Guide to Juvenile Justice in the Twenty-First Century, ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc.
Sci., July 1999, at 10, 14 (stating that "most states continue to deny juveniles access to jury
trials or other rights guaranteed to adults" (citation omitted)).
100. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 368 (1970) (requiring proof beyond a reasonable
doubt in delinquency adjudicatory proceedings where guilt or innocence of a penal viola-
tion is determined).
101. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 41 (1967).
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however, this right to counsel is generally subject to waiver, 10 2 and as a
result many children appear without counsel at these critical hear-
ings.'t°  Furthermore, the lack of ajury, the inbred nature of thejuve-
nile court bureaucracy, and the secrecy surrounding juvenile court
hearings tend to make trials in juvenile court overly informal and
mask the momentous consequences.' °4
The dispositional hearing is analogous to an adult criminal sen-
tencing proceeding where counsel is constitutionally required.0 5 As
noted above, the Gault Court did not mandate counsel at this stage in
juvenile court, yet, in most jurisdictions, assigned counsel will re-
present the child at both the adjudicatory and dispositional hear-
ings. O' Regardless, counsel's role in juvenile dispositional hearings is
both more important and more complicated than in adult sentencing
hearings. Even though there are mandatory commitments for some
offenses in juvenile court,10 7 there are generally more sentencing op-
102. Id. at 42.
103. See Feld, supra note 33, at 1188-89 (noting that "less than fifty percent of juveniles
adjudicated delinquent receive the assistance of counsel to which they are constitutionally
entitled").
104. Justice Douglas described the mental trauma ajuvenile may face when the juvenile
justice system becomes too informal as follows:
The fact is that the procedures which are now followed in juvenile cases are far
more traumatic than the potential experience of a jury trial. Who can say that a
boy who is arrested and handcuffed, placed in a lineup, transported in vehicles
designed to convey dangerous criminals, placed in the same kind of a cell as an
adult, deprived of his freedom by lodging him in an institution where he is sub-
ject to be transferred to the state's prison and in the "hole" has not undergone a
traumatic experience?
The experience of a trial with or without ajury is meant to be impressive and
meaningful. The fact that a juvenile realizes that his case will be decided by
twelve objective citizens would allow the court to retain its meaningfulness with-
out causing any more trauma than a trial before a judge who perhaps has heard
other cases involving the same juvenile in the past and may be influenced by
those prior contacts. To agree that ajury trial would expose ajuvenile to a trau-
matic experience is to lose sight of the real traumatic experience of incarceration
without due process. The real traumatic experience is the feeling of being de-
prived of basic rights.
McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 563-64 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (citations
omitted). For a discussion of the shortfalls of a less formal juvenile adjudicatory system,
see Janet E. Ainsworth, Youth Justice in a Unified Court: Response to Critics of Juvenile Court
Abolition, 36 B.C. L. REv. 927, 928 (1995).
105. Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 137 (1967) (requiring counsel at deferred sentenc-
ing hearings in criminal court).
106. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 700 (West 1998) (requiring that a juvenile have
counsel at a dispositional hearing); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 985.203 (West 2001) (stating that a
child is entitled to counsel at all stages of delinquency proceedings); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 232.11(1)(e) (2000) (requiring that a juvenile have counsel at a dispositional hearing).
107. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 985.215(1) (b) (West Supp. 2002) (stating that if a minor is
"charged with possessing or discharging a firearm on school property [the minor] shall be
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tions than in criminal court. Additionally, the programs used byjuve-
nile probation vary in degree of treatment and structure. 8 Whether
the child goes to a prison-like training school,'0 9 a residential treat-
ment center,'10 is placed in foster care, 1 11 or remains at home on pro-
bation1 12 is of great importance to the child's future development.
Indeed, one might argue that it is at this stage that defense counsel's
active participation can be most effective toward protecting his or her
client." ' Unfortunately, it is here that many attorneys defer to the
"expert" recommendations of an overworked probation
department.' 14
Similarly, probation revocation hearings are essentially the same
as adult revocation proceedings. The court considers whether the
probationer violated the terms of his or her probation and the appro-
placed in secure detention care"); GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-62(a) (2001) (providing that if a
juvenile between the ages of thirteen and seventeen is convicted of certain felonies, the
minor shall be committed to the Department of Corrections); 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
405/5-750(2) (West 1999) (declaring that a minor over the age of thirteen who has been
adjudicated a delinquent based on a first-degree murder offense shall be committed to the
Department of Corrections, Juvenile Division until his or her twenty-first birthday, without
the possibility of parole for at least five years).
108. SeeJames Herbie DiFonzo, Parental Responsibility for Juvenile Crime, 80 OR. L. REv. 1,
16-17 (2001) (noting that between 1992 and 1997 forty-seven states and the District of
Columbia enacted laws enlarging the sentencing options for juveniles).
109. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 1251 (West 1998) (allowing for youth who are too
mature for the California Youth Authority, but not mature enough for adult prison, to be
sent to a more restrictive training school); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-2-909(1)(a) (West
Supp. 2001) (stating that any juvenile adjudicated based on an offense that would be a
felony or misdemeanor for an adult may be placed in a training school).
110. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-341.01(B)(1) (West Supp. 2002) (providing that
a child adjudicated a delinquent may be sent to a residential treatment facility if it will
address the child's "behavioral, psychological, social or mental health needs").
111. See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 727(a) (3) (West Supp. 2003) (allowing for the
placement of an adjudicated delinquent in a foster home).
112. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260B.198(b) (West Supp. 2002) (providing that a de-
linquent child may be placed on probation at home or a foster home).
113. See Hon. Arthur L. Burnett, Sr., What of the Future? Envisioning an Effective Juvenile
Court, CRIM.JUST., Spring 2000, at 7, 9 (arguing that counsel for ajuvenile "may make a far
greater contribution by assisting in designing a disposition plan that may change a child's
life, rerouting ajuvenile's path from repeat offender to a productive and useful citizen").
114. See Hon. Patrick R. Tamilia, In Search ofJuvenile Justice: From Star Chamber to Criminal
Court, 29 AKRON L. REV. 509, 515 (1996) (describing the involvement of probation officers
in juvenile justice). In many jurisdictions the dispositional hearing is held immediately
after the adjudication of guilt, leaving the attorney little time to prepare. See PATRICIA
PURITZ ET AL., A.B.A. JUVENILE JUSTICE CENTER ET AL., A CALL FORJUSTICE: AN ASSESSMENT
OF ACCESS TO COUNSEL AND QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION IN DELINQUENCY PROCEEDINGS 6
(1995) (discussing the overworked juvenile defenders and the busy and hurried court-
houses they work in).
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priate sanction.115 The violations can be the commission of criminal
law offenses or of specific terms of probation, such as failure to report
to the probation officer or failure to keep away from persons con-
victed of crime.1 6 Furthermore, for children, the violation can even
be something as simple as failing to attend school or staying out late at
night." 7 For adults, there exists no federal constitutional right under
the Sixth Amendment or the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to counsel at a probation revocation hearing.11 How-
ever, the Court in Gagnon v. Scarpelli held that in certain circum-
stances due process would require the availability of an attorney if:
there are substantial reasons which "make revocation inappropriate";
the defendant makes a "colorable claim" that he did not violate proba-
tion; and the probationer appears to be incapable of speaking for
himself.11 That last factor alone, in the context ofjuvenile revocation
proceedings, could mandate a per se right to counsel for juvenile pro-
bationers.12 0 Most jurisdictions, however, grant counsel at a juvenile
probation revocation proceeding, only under certain
circumstances. 121
Placement reviews and extension of placement requests are also
critically important for the child. These actions can result in transfers
to harsher and more secure facilities or commitment to longer peri-
115. See In re B.S., 469 N.W.2d 860, 869 (Wis. Ct. App. 1991) (holding that a court must
quickly determine whether ajuvenile has violated a condition in a dispositional order and
what sanctions, if any, have a practical value in each case).
116. See In re Richard M., 993 P.2d 1048, 1049-50 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1999) (finding a viola-
tion of the terms of probation when a juvenile failed to report to his probation officer for
drug and alcohol testing); In re Ivan T., 90 Cal. Rptr. 2d 588, 589 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999)
(stating that the juvenile had violated his terms of probation by committing a criminal act);
P.R. v. State, 782 So. 2d 911, 911 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (noting terms of probation that
forbade the juvenile contact with the other juvenile offenders involved in his case).
117. See People v. Pinholster, 824 P.2d 571, 586 (Cal. 1992) (recounting how ajuvenile's
probation was violated because of curfew infractions); In re Kimble, 682 N.E.2d 1066, 1069-
70 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996) (holding that a juvenile can have his parole revoked for habitual
truancy if he is given notice that truancy is a parole violation).
118. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782 (1973) (stating that probation is not a criti-
cal stage of prosecution which entitles one to counsel).
119. Id. at 790.
120. The State of Florida comes close to granting such a per se right. See FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 985.231 (1) (c) (West 2001) (entitling a child to counsel if the child denies the al-
leged probation violation).
121. See COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 19-2-1004(11) (West 1999) (stating that ajuvenile who
denies parole violation allegations has a right to counsel at a parole revocation hearing);
see also UTAH CODE ANN. § 62A-7-112(3) (2000) (entitling juveniles to counsel at parole
revocation hearings); In re Sproule, No. 99JD83976, 2001 WL 39594, *2 (Ohio Ct. App.
Jan. 17, 2001) (holding that the trial judge has discretion to appoint counsel for ajuvenile
parole revocation hearing).
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ods of incarceration and supervision. 12  These proceedings are akin
to parole decisions, loss of good time determinations, transfers, and
disciplinary actions, and as such, require no right to counsel as they
are viewed as correctional decisions. 23 However, many of the factors
going into these ultimate decisions can be based on disputed facts, yet
an attorney is viewed as an intruder rather than as someone who can
act as an advocate for the child-client. 24 Furthermore, very few states
assign counsel at such proceedings for adults or children. 25
Adult defendants are entitled to counsel on their first appeal as a
matter of Fourteenth Amendment due process and equal protec-
tion, t 2 6 even though the Supreme Court has never held that appellate
review is of constitutional proportions in criminal cases. 127 The Gault
Court declined to determine whether due process requires a tran-
122. Despite the importance of these hearings, some children do not receive them. See
THE CHILDREN LEFT BEHIND: AN ASSESSMENT OF ACCESS TO COUNSEL AND QUALITY OF REPRE-
SENTATION IN DELINQUENCY PROCEEDINGS IN LOUISIANA 64 (Gabriella Celeste & Patricia
Puritz, eds., 2001) (describing a Louisiana study that found eighty-five percent of the youth
in the Louisiana Training Institute had not returned to court for a review hearing and
ninety percent of the youth had no contact with their attorney after being placed at LTI).
A national study conducted by the Juvenile Justice Center of the American Bar Association
found that court appointed attorneys that continue to represent the child after the disposi-
tional hearing tend to do more than public defenders at that stage in the proceeding.
PURITZ ET AL., supra note 114, at 54. Almost all appointed counsel will interview the child
prior to the review hearing and most of them will also interview probation officers and
family members. Id. However, less than twenty-five percent of the attorneys will often
monitor the implementation of the juvenile's treatment plan. Id
123. See Wilkerson v. Patterson, 303 F. Supp. 665, 666-67 (D. Colo. 1969) (discussing the
constitutional rationale for not requiring counsel at correctional decisions).
124. Id. at 667-68.
125. See, e.g., NEB. REv. STAT. § 83-192 (1999) (omitting a prisoner's attorney from the
parole process); NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-1313 (1998) (omitting ajuvenile's attorney from dis-
positional review proceedings).
126. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 357-58 (1963) (vacating the judgment of the
lower court based on the fact that defendants' right to equal protection was violated be-
cause the court had denied defendants' assistance of counsel on appeal). In Ross v. Moffitt,
417 U.S. 600 (1974), the Court held that there was no constitutional right to counsel for
discretionary appellate review. 417 U.S. 600, 610-19 (1979).
127. McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684, 688 (1894) (holding that appellate review is not
mandated by Fourteenth Amendment); cf. Whitney v. State, 389 U.S. 138, 138 (1967) (per
curiam) (dismissing the case because the Court felt it had "improvidently granted" certio-
rari on the issue of whether the Constitution requires appellate collateral review). A signif-
icant number of cases in criminal matters are reversed on appeal. In 1999, fourteen
percent of appeals following a criminal trial in federal court ended in a reversal or remand.
See JOHN SCALIA, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, FEDERAL CRIMINAL APPEALS, 1999 WITH
TRENDS 1985-1999, at 6 (2001). Determining the number of juvenile cases reversed on
appeal, however, is much more difficult. In addition, many attorneys simply do not believe
in filing appeals in juvenile cases, as the sentences are shorter and the courts will not stay
incarceration pending the appeal. See PURITZ ET AL., supra note 114, at 38-39.
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script and appellate review of juvenile proceedings. 12 8 Nonetheless,
all jurisdictions provide appellate review in both criminal and juvenile
cases as a matter of state law. 129 However, many states do not grant
juveniles a right to appointed counsel for appeals. 130 Yet, how can a
minor navigate the complex and arcane rules of appellate review?
Without legal expertise, errors below cannot be rectified; therefore,
juvenile trial court decisions are effectively insulated from corrective
appellate review.' At all stages of juvenile delinquency proceedings
(intake, detention, adjudication, disposition, revocation, placement
review, placement extension, and appeal) the role of counsel for chil-
dren is critical, but is often lacking. As the Gault Court notes, "The
child 'requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the pro-
ceedings against him.'"1
3 2
C. The Reality: Determining Indigency
Like adults, the child's right to appointed counsel is dependent
on indigency,133 which is a flexible criterion."3 4 Often this means that
128. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 58 (1967). Justice Harlan argued that "the [juvenile] court
must maintain a written record, or its equivalent, adequate to permit effective review on
appeal or in collateral proceedings." Id. at 72 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part).
129. See also M.L.B. v. S.L.J. 519 U.S. 102, 110-11 (1996) (offering that the states may
afford juveniles the right to appellate review). All states have granted the right to appellate
review for adults and juveniles. See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 800(a) (West 1998)
(providing juveniles with the right to appeal any final judgment). See also PURITZ ET AL.,
supra note 114, at 38-39 (explaining that although juveniles have the same right to appeal
as adults, appeals are rarely taken from juvenile court decisions).
130. Very few states have statutes that specifically grantjuveniles the right to an attorney
at the appellate stage. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-1606(b) (2000) (specifying that a
juvenile is entitled to an attorney at appeal). In a 1995 survey, thirty-two percent of juve-
nile public defenders indicated they were not authorized to handle appeals, and, although
seventy-five percent of private appointed attorneys were authorized to handle the appeal,
only one out of five attorneys actually took any appeals in the previous year. PURITZ ET AL.,
supra note 114, at 10.
131. Cf Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 561 (1966) (holding that meaningful review
in the context of waiver hearings requires, among other things, an opportunity for counsel
to advocate on behalf of a client over an important decision).
132. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 36 (quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932)).
133. Gideon held that the right to counsel for an indigent defendant in a criminal trial is
a fundamental right under the Fourteenth Amendment. 372 U.S. 335, 342-44 (1963). The
Court went on to state:
[R]eason and reflection require us to recognize that in our adversary system of
criminal justice, any person haled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer,
cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him. This seems to us
to be an obvious truth .... The right of one charged with crime to counsel may
not be deemed fundamental and essential to fair trials in some countries, but it is
in ours. From the very beginning, our.., laws have laid great emphasis on proce-
dural and substantive safeguards designed to assure fair trials before impartial
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the Gault right to counsel is problematic. Theoretically, there are two
possible approaches that courts could take. One is a per se presump-
tion that the child, who is the accused, has no source of funds to pay
counsel absent a trust fund or movie star status.' 35 The parents' re-
sources would simply not be relevant, either before or after the pro-
ceedings. Currently, no state takes that position, although it is one
that would serve the best interests of the child. Under such an ap-
proach, the minor is assured of appointed counsel without reference
to parental resources, which removes a source of tension between par-
tribunals in which every defendant stands equal before the law. This noble ideal
cannot be realized if the poor man charged with crime has to face his accusers
without a lawyer to assist him.
Id. at 344. In re Gault extended the right of counsel to children involved in delinquency
hearings. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 41. Specifically, the Gault Court stated:
We conclude that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires
that in respect of proceedings to determine delinquency which may result in com-
mitment to an institution in which the juvenile's freedom is curtailed, the child
and his parents must be notified of the child's right to be represented by counsel
retained by them, or if they are unable to afford counsel, that counsel will be
appointed to represent the child.
Id.
134. Financial guidelines to determine indigency with respect to court appointed coun-
sel are set by the public defender office or the courts. See COLO. STAT. AN,'N. § 21-1-103(3)
(West Supp. 2002) (requiring the public defender to make the determination); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 27.52(1)(a) (West Supp. 2002) (requiring the Court to make the determination).
Furthermore, jurisdictions will make the decisions regarding indigency differently. See FLA.
SrAT. A-N. § 2 7 .52(g) (West Supp. 2002) (stating that if an accused minor is financially
supported by a parent, parents, a guardian or continues to be claimed as a dependent for
tax purposes, the court will consider the income of the minor's supporter in making the
indigency determination). In Texas, each county is responsible for determining indigency.
TEX. CRUM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 26.04(a) (Vernon Supp. 2002). In Harris County, the juve-
nile judges set indigency at 125% of the poverty level for the family size. TEX. GOVT CODE
ANN. § 51.941 (g) (2) (Vernon Supp. 2002). In Vermont, the state instituted a sliding scale
to determine the amount of attorney fees to be paid by the minor's family. VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 13, § 5238(b) (1998). If the family income is under 125% of the poverty level for the
family's size, there is no charge for attorney services. Id. If the family income for the past
year falls between 125 and 150%, the parents will pay 25% of the attorney fees. Id. At 151
to 175%, the family pays 50 %, between 176 and 200% the cost is 75% of the fees, and at
200% the family covers the full cost. Id. For further information regarding indigency and
representation by counsel see generally Sundeep Kothari, And Justice For All: The Role Equal
Protection and Due Process Principles Have Played in Providing Indigents with Meaningful Access to
the Courts, 72 TUL. L. REv. 2159 (1998), and Wade R. Habeeb, Annotation, Determination of
Indigency of Accused Entitling Him to Appointment of Counsel, 51 A.L.R.3d 1108 (1973).
135. Even a child with a trust fund may face obstacles in accessing the fund, because it
may be necessary to seek court approval. See Franklin v. Newberry, 356 N.Y.S.2d 175, 176
(N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1974) (holding that parents who could not afford to hire an attorney to
represent their child in delinquency proceedings could not seek release of their child's
trust funds to retain counsel because it was the court's obligation to see that the infant's
trust funds were not unnecessarily depleted).
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ent and child in this context." 6 Moreover, most children in juvenile
court come from poor families. 3 ' Thus, hearings to ferret out the
small minority who are able to retain counsel is inefficient and has
serious implications for the question of waiver of counsel. 3 '
The second approach, which is used by all states, determines indi-
gency based on the parents' resources.13 9 However, jurisdictions,
however, use two different methods of ascertaining the parents' ability
to pay for counsel. In the first method, the determination of indi-
gency is made at the beginning of the case. 140 If the parents are not
deemed indigent, the courts will not appoint an attorney, leaving it to
the parents' discretion to retain counsel. In other jurisdictions, courts
appoint counsel to represent the child ab initio, and indigency is ascer-
tained after the fact.1 41 If the parents are found able to afford coun-
sel, the court will recoup the attorney's fees from them after the
delinquency proceedings are concluded. 42 Although it may superfi-
cially appear that the answer to the question of indigency is thus
largely procedural, in fact, there are enormous substantive ramifica-
tions from the way in which indigency is evaluated.
143
When a court determines indigency based on the parents' in-
come before trial, it makes the ability of the juvenile to obtain repre-
sentation dependent on a third party's resources over which the child
has no control. This means that if a judge determines that the par-
136. See In re Ricky H., 468 P.2d 204, 205-06 (Cal. 1970) (discussing how the child de-
cided to waive his right to counsel when the court told him that his father would have to
reimburse the county for the costs).
137. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
138. See In re Ricky H., 468 P.2d at 205-06 (illustrating how financial concerns of a family
may actually outweigh a child's interest in retaining counsel).
139. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 51-299 (West 1985); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 27.52(1)(g) (West
Supp. 2002); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 51.10(0(2) (Vernon 2002).
140. MD. CODE ANN. RULES § 11-106(b)(2) (2002); S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 26-7A-31
(Michie Supp. 2002); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 51.10(d) (Vernon 2002); In re W.B.J., 966
P.2d 295, 298 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (deciding not to appoint counsel to represent a delin-
quent child because that child's family could afford an attorney).
141. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 634 (West 1998) (stating that the California courts
shall appoint counsel for a delinquent juvenile if he appears at the hearing without coun-
sel, whether he is able to afford counsel or not, in the absence of an intelligent waiver of
counsel by the juvenile); In reJ.B., 603 A.2d 368, 368 (Vt. 1991) (holding that the court
must appoint counsel and seek reimbursement from the parents, to the extent that they
are able to pay, if the child is not indigent, and parents are unwilling to provide an
attorney).
142. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 27.52(2) (d); see also MAss. GEN. LAWS ch. 119, § 39F (West 2001)
(concluding that after appointment of counsel the court may assess the cost of attorney's
fees against the parent or guardian).
143. See In re Ricky H., 468 P.2d 204, 205-06 (Cal. 1970) (showing that a family's finan-
cial circumstances may cause a child to waive counsel and face trial without
representation).
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ents' income is sufficient to hire an attorney, the court will not ap-
point one. If the parents do not obtain legal representation for their
child, he or she will be unrepresented, unless the court orders the
parents to retain counsel under pain of contempt or appoints counsel
for the child and orders the parents to reimburse the attorney.14 4 In
contrast, when the court appoints counsel at the beginning of the case
and determines indigency at the end of the proceedings, the child is
assured of representation throughout the case.14 5
The substantive issue of what constitutes indigency is also prob-
lematic. Many courts will find that parents are not indigent, even
when the family has few resources and can barely make ends meet.
Thus, the working poor may be left without adequate representation,
subjected to contempt proceedings, or faced with reimbursal
orders.' 4 6
Although parents may barely surpass the guidelines for indi-
gency, they may choose not to hire an attorney for various reasons.
Parents with limited circumstances, may, for example, decide that hir-
ing a lawyer is not as important as paying rent, buying food, buying a
new car needed for work, providing a talented child with music les-
sons or a sick sibling with special medical treatment. Parents, poor or
well-to-do, may have other reasons for not retaining counsel. They
may have been experiencing difficulties with their offspring or they
may think the child needs to be taught a lesson and that a lawyer
would interfere with that end. Also, they may take the position that
there is no reason to hire a lawyer because the child is guilty of com-
mitting the delinquent act, and they may not be aware of the possible
legal defenses and the need for representation at disposition. Alterna-
tively, parents may not hire a lawyer even when the child says he is
innocent, on the theory that the juvenile court system is benign and
the judge will believe their child's version of the facts. Finally, parents
may choose not to hire an attorney because they want the child re-
moved from their home, thus placing the interests of the parents and
child in direct conflict.
Even though it is preferable for courts to appoint counsel at the
beginning of the proceedings and determine the parents' ability to
reimburse the state afterwards, there are serious consequences even to
144. See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
145. See supra notes 141-142 and accompanying text (requiring counsel to be provided
first, leaving the question of reimbursement for a subsequent determination).
146. Cf Kothari, supra note 134, at 2161-69 (discussing the development of federal indi-




that approach. Forcing parents to pay for retained counsel when they
are unable or unwilling to pay an attorney may exacerbate existing
family tensions and result in further acting-out by the child.' 47 More-
over, as we will see, imposing such a financial obligation on the par-
ents may also affect the issue of waiving counsel. 4 '
D. The Reality: Waiver of the Right to Counsel
Per Gault, every jurisdiction provides the right to counsel for
juveniles accused of crime, at least at the adjudicatory hearing. 149
That right, however, is not to the automatic assignment of counsel,
but rather is the right to choose whether to have counsel.'l 0 This, of
course, raises the issue of waiver, an issue that is particularly critical
when dealing with youthful offenders.
Although states are currently inconsistent in their handling of
waivers of counsel by juveniles, there are two main approaches for de-
termining when waiver of counsel by juveniles is appropriate. The
first category does not allow a juvenile to waive the right to counsel
under any circumstances. 15 1 In effect, these states find the adult's
right to self-representation 52 and the requirement that the waiver of
counsel and guilty pleas be an intentional relinquishment of a known
right1 53 inapplicable to alleged delinquents. 154 In other words, a child
may neither waive counsel, nor represent herself, even if it is only to
plead guilty. Jurisdictions in the second category allow children to
waive their right to counsel at any stage, so long as it is knowing, intel-
ligent, and voluntary. 1 5
5
147. See In re Ricky H., 468 P.2d at 210 (arguing that forcing a parent to reimburse the
state for the cost of a child's counsel "cast(s] an undesirable chill upon the minor's free
exercise of the right to appointed counsel").
148. See id. at 205-06 (discussing how the child chose to waive counsel rather than have
his indebted father reimburse the county).
149. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 41 (1967).
150. See id. at 42 (providing that "[i]f [the mother and son] were unable to afford to
employ counsel, they were entitled in view of the seriousness of the charge and the poten-
tial commitment, to appointed counsel, unless they chose waiver").
151. See Caeti et al., supra note 98, at 622-23 (listing eight states as having mandatory
appointment of counsel in juvenile cases with no waiver option).
152. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 821 (1975) (holding that the Sixth Amendment
provides for a right to self-representation).
153. SeeJohnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 468-69 (1938) (holding that the Sixth Amend-
ment right to counsel may be waived explicitly).
154. See Feld, supra note 33, at 1201-02 (explaining the Faretta and Johnson holdings and
describing how these principles have never been applied by the Supreme Court with re-
spect to a juvenile).
155. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-2-14(E) (Michie 1999) (stating that the court will
consider a variety of factors in determining whether the child waived counsel "knowingly,
intelligently and voluntarily"). In some jurisdictions, the law will not permit waiver of
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In the first category, the courts or the legislatures have presuma-
bly determined that counsel's participation in the proceedings is nec-
essary to assure due process for the child and at the same time is
helpful to the court.'56 In addition, they may view it as unlikely that
any child can make a knowing and intelligent waiver of counsel.
5 7
Even if some minors do have the capacity to waive, some courts may
believe they are few in number, and a per se rule is more efficient
than trying to look at all the circumstances to determine if a child is
making a knowing and voluntary waiver.' 5 8
In the jurisdictions that permit children to dispense with counsel,
courts set different criteria for the acceptability of a waiver. In some
instances, courts may permit children to waive the right to counsel on
their own,1 59 presumably after the court explains the nature of the
proceedings and the possible consequences, 60 or they may only be
able to waive counsel if they first consult with an attorney16 1 or their
counsel for adjudicatory hearings. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. § 938.23(1) (b) (2) (West 2000)
(clarifying that if the delinquency petition is contested an attorney must represent the
juvenile).
156. See BruceJ. Winick, Redefining the Role of the Criminal Defense Lawyer at Plea Bargaining
and Sentencing: A Therapeutic Jurisprudence/Preventive Law Model, 5 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'v & L.
1034, 1079 (1999) (claiming that a defense attorney in a juvenile transfer hearing can be
helpful by presenting evidence to the court or discussing the matter informally with the
prosecution).
157. See Grisso, supra note 70, at 1137, 114043 (arguing that a per se rule requiring an
adult to be present when a juvenile waives his or her right to counsel is necessary because
"the vast majority of juveniles will not understand their rights when advised of them").
158. The Court's opinion in Miranda provides analogous reasoning:
The Fifth Amendment privilege is so fundamental to our system of constitutional
rule and the expedient of giving an adequate warning as to the availability of the
privilege so simple, we will not pause to inquire in individual cases whether the
defendant was aware of his rights without a warning being given. Assessments of
the knowledge the defendant possessed, based on information as to his age, edu-
cation, intelligence, or prior contact with authorities, can never be more than
speculation; a warning is a clearcut fact.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 468-69 (1966) (footnote omitted). For an argument
advocating the use of prophylactic rules over discretionary standards, see Kathleen M. Sul-
livan, The Supreme Court, 1991 Term-Forewort The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV.
L. REv. 24, 62-66 (1992).
159. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-2-14(E) (Michie 1999) (permitting a child to waive
the right to counsel if the court determines that the child waived the right "knowingly,
intelligently and voluntarily").
160. SeeJohnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 468 (1938) (holding that the Sixth Amendment
acts as a bar to a conviction if the defendant did not competently waive the right to
counsel).
161. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:4A-39(b) (1) (West 1987) (stating that ajuvenile must,
among other things, consult with counsel prior to waiving his or her right to counsel).
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parents. 162 There are several difficulties with this approach, even
when parents and attorneys must be consulted first. Studies indicate
that children may not be able to make knowing or intelligent waivers
on their own, at least with respect to the limited right to counsel to
protect their Fifth Amendment interests. 16' For example, Dr. Thomas
Grisso has shown that fifteen-year-olds cannot fully comprehend their
rights under Miranda, no matter how simply explained, and therefore
cannot make knowing and intelligent waivers.1 64 While sixteen- and
seventeen-year-olds may have a slightly easier task in understanding
the impact of waiving these legal rights,1 65 they still do not have the
same grasp of the concepts as an adult.'66 Further, although it may be
easier for a child to understand why it would be more important to
have a lawyer in court proceedings rather than during custodial inter-
rogations, it is doubtful that most children can make that
distinction.' 67
Furthermore, it is much easier for an adult in a position of au-
thority, such as a judge or parent, to pressure a child into waiving
counsel than it would be to apply this pressure to an adult.168 For
example, judges may inform minors that the court wants to help them
and return them home quickly, or that if they want a lawyer, the case
would have to be adjourned. Particularly if the child is also under the
strain of detention, he or she may feel that involvement by an attorney
162. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 47-12.090(a) (Michie 2000) (providing that a parent must
concur for a minor to effectively waive his or her right to counsel, except in a matter
analogous to an adult felony when the minor must also consult with counsel).
163. See THOMAS GRIsso, JUVENILES' WAIVER OF RIGHTS: LEGAL & PSYCHOLOGICAL COMPE-
TENCE 191-96 (1981) (arguing that juveniles' understanding of Fifth Amendment rights is
vastly inadequate).
164. Id. at 193-94.
165. See id. at 192 (finding that children older than sixteen understood their Fifth
Amendment rights at a higher level than did those younger than fifteen).
166. See Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 733 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting) (arguing
that the sixteen-year-old respondent was "immature, emotional, and uneducated, and
therefore was likely to be vulnerable to the skillful, two-on-one, repetitive style of interroga-
tion to which he was subjected"); Grisso, supra note 70, at 1166 (concluding that "younger
juveniles as a class do not understand the nature and significance of their Miranda rights
to ... counsel").
167. See Grisso, supra note 70, at 1160-66 (advocating a per se approach to juveniles'
waiver of counsel since most juveniles fail to understand their legal rights).
168. In a study done by Dr. Grisso about the role of parents in encouraging children to
remain silent, he found that parents actually had the opposite effect. GRIsso, supra note
163, at 166-68. Only about two percent of parents told their children not to talk without an
attorney; almost seventeen percent of parents encouraged their children to talk; and ap-
proximately seventy-one percent of the parents said nothing at all, thus, allowing the child
to talk. Id. at 185. Parents are often as nervous as the child and may actually make the
children feel even more coerced. Id. at 167.
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would only exacerbate the problem further. Judges, especially those
who must be elected, may have incentives for getting children to waive
counsel, such as saving state or county funds, expediting hearings, and
imposing harsh punishment to maintain a law and order reputa-
tion. "'69 Indeed, there are studies indicating that judges impose har-
sher punishment on children who do not waive their right to
counsel. 170
If a parent does not want to be responsible for the costs involved
in retaining an attorney or otherwise does not want counsel represent-
ing the child, the parent may encourage the child to waive legal repre-
sentation. Even an attorney consultation before the child can waive
his or her right to counsel may not be sufficient to protect the minor.
Since the lawyer is not yet retained or appointed, and has no relation-
ship with the youth, he or she may not spend sufficient time with the
child to explain the consequences and to elicit sufficient facts about
the case in order to properly advise the child of the benefits an attor-
ney can provide.1 71 Moreover, the attorney may have an incentive to
get alleged delinquents to waive counsel so that he or she may main-
tain a good relationship with the judge. 172
As I later explain, I believe children should be able to make the
ultimate decisions in legal proceedings. Therefore, if an attorney rep-
resents to the court that he has explained the consequences and
ramifications of waiver, and in his opinion, the child understands
what he or she is giving up, and the judge inquires of the juvenile to
assure that he or she understands the right to counsel and the conse-
quences of waiver, the court should accept the child's waiver. How-
ever, based on my experience in the juvenile court system, I ultimately
opt for a per se rule prohibiting waiver of counsel by minors. I simply
do not believe that the standards-based approach to waiver in this con-
text is one that is sufficiently protective of children, nor do I believe
that appellate review will properly ferret out the cases in which the
court accepted improper waivers. 173 Mandatory counsel also prevents
169. See Barry C. Feld, In re Gault Revisited: A Cross-State Comparison of the Right to Counsel
inJuvenile Court, 34 CRIME & DELINQ. 393, 395 (1988) (listing reasons why children are not
always appointed counsel at adjudicatory hearings).
170. Id. at 418-20; see also Feld, supra note 33, at 1322-34.
171. See Feld, supra note 169, at 419 (hypothesizing about reasons for ineffectiveness of
juvenile public defenders).
172. Id.
173. In Godinez v. Moran, the Court found that the defendant was competent to give a
knowing and intelligent waiver of counsel and represent himself even though he was de-
pressed, had psychological problems, and was on medication. 509 U.S. 389, 394 & n.3,
400-02 (1993). Justice Blackmun, in dissent, stated that although an individual may be
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overbearing judges and parents from influencing a child to waive
counsel and prevents judges from imposing punishment based on the
child's choice of waiver.174 Therefore, I believe the per se rule is de-
sirable for the child and the courts.
Nevertheless, this position is fraught with its own dangers. The
children are more likely to distrust the attorneys and simply see them
as another government official foisted on them.'75 In such cases, it
will be difficult for counsel to elicit the necessary information and pro-
vide a proper defense. Moreover, the attorney may still cater to over-
bearing judges by pleading his or her client guilty.176 On balance, I
still conclude that the court must assign counsel to represent children
appearing in juvenile court regardless of the child's wishes. After that
point, however, as I will explain later, the accused child should deter-
mine how the defense is to be conducted. 177
E. The Reality: The Role of Parents and the Right to Counsel
An attorney representing adults in criminal court usually has to
deal only with her client.' 78 In juvenile court there is an added wrin-
kle-the parents. In Gault, Justice Fortas recognized the parental in-
terest in delinquency cases and required that both the child and
parent be notified of the right to counsel.179 However, he also made
clear that counsel was to be appointed to "represent the child."'8s
Many parents find it difficult to believe that the child is the client and,
competent to stand trial, he may not be capable of making a decision to defend himself in
criminal proceedings. Id. at 416 (Blackmun,J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun also wrote:
To try, convict, and punish one so helpless to defend himself contravenes funda-
mental principles of fairness and impugns the integrity of our criminal justice
system. I cannot condone the decision to accept, without further inquiry, the self-
destructive "choice" of a person who was so deeply medicated and who might well
have been severely mentally ill.
Id. at 417.
174. See Feld, supra note 169, at 395 (explaining that abuse of the waiver right results in
an abundance of unrepresented youths). Of course, such judicial behavior may simply be
postponed and redirected at the adjudicatory hearing so that children who go to trial with
counsel will be subject to harsher punishment. Id.
175. Buss, supra note 79, at 1710-11.
176. See Feld, supra note 33, at 1331 (arguing that some counsel may be swayed by the
prospects of getting into or remaining in a judge's graces).
177. See infra notes 299-304 and accompanying text.
178. Furthermore, adults' attorney-client relationships may be influenced by relatives,
friends, and spouses, but generally their power to influence the adult defendant is not as
great as with a child-client and their parent.
179. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 41 (1967) (holding that "the child and his parents must
be notified of the child's right to be represented by counsel").
180. Id. (stating that "if [the parents and child] are unable to afford counsel, that coun-
sel will be appointed to represent the child").
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therefore, the one who makes the ultimate decisions."'' They feel en-
titled to sit in on attorney-client interviews and to determine the direc-
tion of the representation. In doing so, parents often clash with the
attorney on what should be done. Additionally, parents will often try
to subvert their children's decision-making power by telling them they
must do what they (the parents) want. l8 2 Furthermore, some parents
will provide information to the probation department which is then
used against the child, and indeed, parental complaints are the basis
for many petitions for violation of probation.1 83
In the criminal courts, relatives and friends are under no illusion
as to the consequences of the criminal proceeding. Therefore, they
tend to look to the attorney as the expert who can shield the defen-
dant from criminal sanctions. On the other hand, parents do not al-
ways understand what can happen to their children in juvenile court,
because they may view it as a therapeutic institution.184 In such cases,
the parents see the attorney as an intruder who may stand in the way
of what is beneficial to the child.1 85
One way to resolve conflicts between parents, children, and attor-
neys is to make clear to the parents the consequences of different
181. See GRisso, supra note 163, at 187 (explaining that when parents give advice to their
children about waiver of counsel they "almost always urge[] their children to waive [their]
rights").
182. See id. at 167. Parents will often exert pressure on the child to "confess" or ask the
court to remove the child from the home. Id. Parents can be embarrassed by the proceed-
ings and try to coerce the child to take responsibility for their actions. Id. It may not seem
bad for a parent to be involved in the attorney-client relationship and encourage the child
to be "truthful," but problems arise when the child's interests are different from the par-
ent's and it may be difficult to determine if the child is being truthful or just reacting to
pressure from the parent. Id. at 188-89.
183. In most jurisdictions there is no parent-child privilege at least with respect to adult
offspring, and therefore, parents can be forced to testify against their children. David L.
Cheatham, Comment, Kids Say the Damnedest Things: A Call for Adoption of a Statutory Parent-
Child Confidential Communications Privilege in Response to Tougher Juvenile Sentencing Guidelines,
8 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 393, 404 (2002) (stating that only New York currently acknowl-
edges the existence of a parent-child privilege at common law, while only Idaho and Min-
nesota have legislatively granted the privilege); see also Betsy Booth, Comment,
Underprivileged Communications: The Rationale for a Parent-Child Testimonial Privilege, 36 Sw.
L.J. 1175, 1185-95 (1982) (discussing the recognition of the parent-child privilege).
184. See Cheatham, supra note 183, at 407 (explaining that a false sense of security exists
for parents in juvenile courts because of the informality and lighter sentences but noting
that many states are seeking to toughen measures against juvenile offenders).
185. In Rapoport v. Berman, ajuvenile court judge had prohibited the attorney represent-
ing a status offender from speaking with the child's parent on the theory it violated the
Canons of Ethics for an attorney in a civil proceeding to interview an opposing party. 373
N.Y.S.2d 652, 653 (N.Y. App. Div. 1975). The appellate court reversed on ripeness
grounds, but noted that the child's attorney had a right to interview prospective witnesses,
including the parents. Id. at 653-54.
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choices. I represented a child who was accused of larceny. The child
came from a poor family where expensive sneakers were a luxury, and
he readily admitted to me that he stole a fellow student's Nike shoes.
In addition, the boy had problems in school with bouts of absentee-
ism. After I interviewed him, my client advised me that he did not
want to plead guilty and asked if I would meet with his parents to
explain his decision to have a trial notwithstanding his guilt. When I
initially told the parents that their son committed the crime, but did
not want to plead guilty, the parents reacted with anger and wanted to
force him to plead guilty. I then explained to them the consequences
of their child being adjudicated a delinquent, including, because of
his school problems, possible placement in a state facility.'" 6 I further
advised the parents that I thought there was a good likelihood that the
sneakers were inadmissible on the ground that they were obtained as
a result of an unlawful search and seizure."l 7 Without this evidence,
the child could not be convicted. Albeit reluctantly, the parents even-
tually agreed with my recommended course of action.
Sometimes it is not so easy. I also represented a juvenile who was
being detained because of a probation violation. He wanted to go
home, and his mother did not want him; in fact, she had called the
probation officer about the violation. She had been in prison, as was
the boy's father currently, and she did not want to see her son follow
in their footsteps. She was hoping that the juvenile system would be
therapeutic and divert him from a life of crime. At my client's re-
quest, I discussed the matter with her at length, including the nature
of the proceedings and the quality of placement facilities, but she re-
mained adamant. As a result of her testimony, the court removed the
child from the home and placed him in a locked facility. I later
learned that he had been raped by other inmates of the training
school. When he was released, he was involved in several violent
crimes for which he was incarcerated in adult prison. I am not claim-
ing that every child who is placed in youth prisons can expect this
future, but it is not an improbable scenario. 8
186. For a discussion on the impact of truancy on the disposition in a delinquency pro-
ceeding, see Irene Merker Rosenberg & Yale L. Rosenberg, Truancy, School Phobia and Mini-
mal Brain Dysfunction, 61 MINN. L. REv. 543, 54647 (1977).
187. Although the Supreme Court has never explicitly held that the exclusionary rule of
the Fourth Amendment applies to delinquency proceedings, most states have decided that
it does. See Rosenberg, supra note 99, at 58-59.
188. It is not uncommon for violence to occur in juvenile prisons. A recent editorial
from Charlotte, North Carolina discussed that violence has been an ongoing problem in
the state's juvenile prisons that house one thousand twelve- to eighteen-year-olds. Legisla-
ture Responsible for Dff; Lawmakers Must Find a Way to Fix Problems at Juvenile Prisons, CHAR-
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Sometimes clients will divulge confidential information that they
do not want their parents to know. One of my clients stole clothing
from a friend of hers. She told me not to tell her mother she was
guilty. The mother kept pressing me as to the content of my discus-
sions with her daughter. I told her that confidential communications
between client and attorney did not include parents t89 She was so
angry that she threatened not to appear at trial to show support for
her daughter. In effect, the mother saw her daughter as an extension
of herself and argued, concededly with some validity, that unless she
knew the truth she would not be able to establish a proper parenting
approach with her child. The problem was that the mother said if her
daughter had committed the theft, she would make her accept re-
sponsibility and plead guilty. The client, when advised that she could
probably be acquitted at trial, did not share her mother's view. The
girl was ultimately acquitted, and her mother never knew the truth.
Then there are parents who are abusive or neglectful. In that
instance, the juvenile court can be a better forum than the criminal
court. In criminal court, abuse or neglect would, at best, only be con-
sidered a mitigating factor at sentencing,' 90 whereas in juvenile court,
in some states, the information can be used to remove the stigma of
delinquency from the child and bring neglect proceedings against the
parent.' 9 '
I represented a child who stole food from a store. He was
charged with larceny, and he was held in detention because his
LoTrE OBSERVER, June 9, 2002, at I1Y. In North Louisiana, the state assumed operation of
ajuvenile prison from a private company because of all the violence and abuse inflicted by
inmates and guards. The Violence Continues, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Dec. 21, 2001 at 6. However,
two years later, the violence was continuing and one guard admitted that "fractured jaws
are not an unusual occurrence." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
189. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2002) (requiring that "[a] lawyer shall
not reveal information relating to the representation of a client unless the client gives
informed consent"); MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 4-1, 4-4 (2000) (describing
the limits of the attorney-client privilege); MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-
101 (B) (discussing when a lawyer can and cannot reveal client confidences). Furthermore,
the IJA/ABAjuvenile justice Standards state specifically that an attorney should not reveal
confidences of a juvenile client to anyone, including the parent of the minor. JUVENILE
JUSTICE STANDARDS ANNOTATED § 3.3(b) (i) (1996).
190. See, e.g., Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 113-14 (1982) (illustrating that miti-
gating evidence may be used to decrease a sentence).
191. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 241.1(a), (d) (West Supp. 2002) (requiring the
county probation department to make an initial status determination of a child, as a de-
pendent, delinquent, or status offender). But see In re Blakes, 281 N.E.2d 454, 457 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1972) (dismissing and affirming the lower court's delinquency adjudication and
training school commitment for a child that claimed his theft of a bag of potato chips was




mother refused to take him home. During my lengthy interviews with
him, he admitted that he stole the food to feed himself and his
younger sister. His mother was an abusive alcoholic, and maintained
a chaotic household. My client had kept this information secret from
the probation officer who interviewed him. Initially, he told me he
did not want these facts relayed to the court. After many hours of
discussion, he finally agreed to release of the information and to be
placed outside the home. The mother was livid and threatened both
of us-first, she threatened to have me removed from the case, and
second, that her son would later pay for this dearly. I filed a motion
asking the court to treat the child as a dependent rather than as a
delinquent" 2 and the court placed the child and his sister in a foster
home as neglected children.
Sometimes the parents' criminal activity is directly responsible for
the child's unlawful acts. For example, some parents use their chil-
dren as mules to buy and sell narcotics. 19 3 The parents are anxious to
conceal this information from the court and insist on sitting in on the
attorney-client interviews to discourage their children from talking
about their parents' involvement in the criminal activity. Indeed,
some parents, to protect themselves, will encourage their children to
plead guilty in juvenile court so their own complicity remains secret.
The parents justify their behavior on the ground that their child will
only get a slap on the wrist, whereas they would go to prison for a long
time.
A study of adolescents on death row reported extreme examples
of parental abuse and self protection.' 9 4 The children had been con-
victed in criminal court for capital offenses even though they were
192. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 241.1(a), (d). California law states:
Whenever a minor appears to come within the description of both Section 300
[dependency] and Section 601 [delinquency] or 602 [status offenses], the county
probation department and the child protective services department shall ... ini-
tially determine which status will serve the best interests of the minor and the
protection of society .... Nothing in this section shall be construed to authorize
the filing of a petition.., or the entry of an order by the juvenile court, to make a
minor simultaneously both a dependent child and a ward of the court.
Id.
193. I often confronted this situation when I conducted classes for juveniles who had
been in trouble with the law. Most of the juveniles were in the class for a drug offense and
many times it was the parent who actually dealt or used the drugs. The parents would
encourage their own children to "help" the family financially by dealing drugs because the
"child" would get a lighter sentence than the parent.
194. Dorothy Otnow Lewis et al., Neuropsychiatric, Psychoeducational, and Family Character-
istics of 14Juveniles Condemned to Death in the United States, 145 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 584, 586-87
(1988); see also Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 398 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(discussing the findings of Dr. Lewis's study).
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adolescents.1 1 5 A multi-disciplinary team discovered that almost all of
them had been "brutally, physically abused" as younger children, suf-
fered major neurological impairment, and displayed psychotic symp-
toms.' 96 Their parents had histories of alcohol and drug abuse and
psychiatric hospitalization.'9 7 These matters were not raised at the
trial either because the child or the parents concealed or minimized
the abuse."' 8 The youths were ashamed and the parents wanted to
avoid blame.199 Some parents, in fact, had urged the judge to impose
the death penalty.2 ° Perhaps most disturbing was the failure of de-
fense counsel to elicit and use the mitigating evidence at trial and
sentencing. 20 1 In fact, some attorneys had divided loyalties and urged
the medical team to conceal or discount the parental abuse, notwith-
standing that their clients would be executed.20 2
In sum, parents of children alleged to be delinquents can be an
impediment to zealous advocacy by insisting on sitting in on attorney-
client interviews, demanding that their children plead guilty, testifying
against their children, or trying to hide neglectful behavior including
their own complicity in the crime. Not all parents present such
problems and it is helpful when parents are on the child's side. The
attorney, however, must be aware at all times that the child, not the
parent, is the client. If there is a clash between parent and child, the
child must come first.
Gaps in representation, the lack of a per se rule for indigency,
peculiarities of waiver for children, and conflicts of interest between
parent and child mean that the reality of the juvenile's right to coun-
195. Lewis et al., supra note 194, at 585. The Supreme Court has held that the imposi-
tion of capital punishment on a person for a crime committed when the defendant was
sixteen or older did not violate the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the Eighth
Amendment. See Stanford, 492 U.S. at 380. The Court decided otherwise with respect to
fifteen-year-olds. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 838 (1988) (plurality) (invalidat-
ing a death penalty imposed on a person who committed a capital offense when he was
fifteen years old). Justice O'Connor concurred in the Court's judgment and left open the
possibility that under certain circumstances it might be constitutional for the state to exe-
cute fifteen-year-olds. Id. at 848-49 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment).
196. See Lewis et al., supra note 194, at 586-87.
197. Id. at 587.
198. Id. at 587-88.
199. Id. at 588.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id. (describing how these attorneys wanted to "spare the family any
embarrassment").
20031 325
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 62:288
sel does not live up to the promise of Gault.2 3 For children, the right
to counsel remains elusive.
II. THE FALSE DICHOTOMY OF ZEALOUS ADVOCACY VERSUS THE
CHILD's BEST INTERESTS
The deficiencies noted above are often compounded by lawyers'
confusion about their proper role when they represent a juvenile.
Many attorneys practicing in juvenile court view their role in repre-
senting minors in delinquency cases more as guardian ad litems who
seek the child's best interests, 20 4 than as zealous advocates for the
child-client. 20 5 The attorneys who see themselves as guardian ad
litems are often passive and somewhat uncomfortable dealing with
"criminal matters" in the juvenile court atmosphere.20 6 Conflict is
seen not only as unnecessary, but harmful.207 To such attorneys, serv-
ing the best interests of the child-client usually means following the
disposition recommended by the probation department, even if it is
203. See Melton, supra note 61, at 148-49 (explaining how In re Gault "promised radical
change in juvenile justice" but this promise has not been "followed to its conclusion").
204. Many courts agree with this viewpoint. See, e.g., In reK.M.B., 462 N.E.2d 1271, 1273
(Ill. App. Ct. 1984) (finding that it was entirely appropriate for the child's attorney to
express her opinion that the minor's out of home placement would be in her best inter-
ests, despite the fact that K.M.B. wanted to remain at home). The court concluded that
the "recommendation [of counsel] was based on her professional evaluation ... and indi-
cate[d] . . . not only that K.M.B. received counsel but that she received [a] very conscien-
tious counsel ... [who] is to be highly commended." Id.
Recently, students taking my Children's Rights course at the University of Houston
Law Center informed me that several attorneys had told them that they saw themselves
more as guardian ad litems than as an attorney representing a client charged with a crimi-
nal offense.
205. The IJA/ABAjuvenile Justice Standards state that an attorney in delinquency pro-
ceedings "should ordinarily be bound by the client's definition of his or her interests with
respect to admission or denial of the facts or conditions alleged," JUVENILE JUSTICE STAN-
DARDS ANNOTATED § 3.1 (b) (ii) [a] (1996), and that "[tihe active participation of counsel at
disposition is often essential to protection of clients' rights and.., the lawyer's most valua-
ble service to clients will be rendered at this stage of the proceeding," id. § 9.1.
206. To some degree it is understandable that attorneys react in this manner. For years,
the juvenile court was seen as an institution that was there to help the child and do what
was in the child's best interests. This mindset can influence all the actors in juvenile court.
SeeJanet E. Ainsworth, Re-Imagining Childhood and Reconstructing the Legal Order: The Case for
Abolishing the Juvenile Court, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1083, 1129-30 (1991) (discussing that the "rea-
son for less than zealous defense advocacy is the ambiguity felt by many juvenile court
lawyers concerning their proper role"); David A. Harris, The Criminal Defense Lawyer in the
JuvenileJustice System, 26 U. TOL. L. REV. 751, 762-63 (1995) (discussing how an attorney
either cooperates with the court and gets to contribute to the decision, or advocates to the
hilt, falls in disfavor with the court, and becomes cut out of the loop).
207. See Ainsworth, supra note 206, at 1129 (stating that attorneys who exhibit "excessive
zeal" in representing their clients are often reminded by the court that such attitudes are
"inappropriate and counter-productive").
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incarceration, and even though one might argue that the best inter-
ests of the child-client would be better served by keeping the child out
of prison-like detention facilities. 20 8 The term "kiddie court" is a re-
vealing aphorism denoting informality, the absence of traditional
lawyering, social work attitudes, and either the dispensing of slaps on
the wrist punishment or therapeutic treatment.20 9
Even some criminal law attorneys are guilty of acquiring a pater-
nalistic attitude when they practice in juvenile court. They are accus-
tomed to adult court and adult sentences; therefore, they often
mistake juvenile court dispositions as being of minor consequence.2 1 0
To them, the juvenile court system is benign and incomparable to the
criminal justice system in terms of restraints on personal liberty.211
Indeed, the juvenile court is considered more of a child welfare
agency than a true court.2 12 What many people fail to appreciate is
that the juvenile court has become increasingly punitive. Many juve-
nile codes now openly speak of the need to punish children for
wrongdoing and prescribe mandatory and often lengthy sentences for
delinquents. 213
208. See infra notes 240-266 and accompanying text (discussing the deplorable condi-
tions in some juvenile detention facilities).
209. See Ainsworth, supra note 206, at 1130 (describing the general belief that the
sentences in juvenile courts are "palliative" and "radically less severe" than those given in
adult courts); see also Harris, supra note 206, at 762-63 (explaining the role of attorneys and
judges in juvenile courtrooms).
210. See SELLINGJUsTICE SHORT, supra note 99, at 16 (stating that many judges and attor-
neys believe that juvenile law is "'easy law,'" not requiring any excessive efforts because,
"'after all, it's not like these are capital cases or anything'"); Ainsworth, supra note 206, at
1127-28 (characterizing many lawyers as "seriously inadequate" when practicing in juvenile
courts, because they fail to adequately prepare, make few objections, or call few witnesses).
211. Cf Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 255-57 (1984) (upholding a statute authorizing
pretrial detention of a child alleged to be a delinquent if there was "a serious risk" he
would commit a crime). Indeed, the Supreme Court itself has fostered such a belief. See
id. at 265 (arguing that although children have an "interest in freedom from institutional
restraints, . that interest must be qualified by the recognition that juveniles, unlike
adults, are always in some form of custody").
212. Professor Harris describes the situation in the following way:
The judge may [be seen as] little more than a super social worker in a robe ....
doing what was "necessary" to help the child ... [and, therefore,] commit[ting]
all [individuals]-even defense counsel-to a nonlegal, helping approach....
Simply put, no one in the system wants counsel assigned to represent juvenile
offenders to act as a "real" lawyer would.
See Harris, supra note 206, at 763-64 (footnote omitted).
213. Several states have changed their juvenile codes to place a stronger emphasis on
punishment and to hold juveniles accountable. See, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 19-2-
102(1) (West Supp. 2002) (stating that in order to protect the public, the juvenile system
"will appropriately sanction juveniles who violate the law"). For a further discussion on the
changes of the juvenile justice system from rehabilitation to punishment, see Giardino,
2003]
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Furthermore, a two- or three-year sentence for a child who is in
the midst of rapid development may be more harmful than a ten-year
sentence for an adult. To children, even adolescents, time is mea-
sured differently from adults and the same two-year sentence may
have much more severe consequences. 214 Removing a child from his
or her home, school, and community can have devastating effects, in-
cluding recidivism both as a child 2 15 and as an adult.216 Moreover, in
some jurisdictions, a sentence rendered in juvenile court can be as
long as the sentence imposed for a comparable crime committed by
an adult offender.217 Sentences imposed by juvenile courts may even
extend beyond the period when the child offender is legally under the
jurisdiction of the juvenile authorities.2 18 In California, for example,
when the child reaches eighteen, he or she may be transferred to an
adult facility, and at twenty-five the prisoner must be transferred.
219
This blurring of the distinction between juvenile and criminal
court is also exemplified by the Texas determinate sentencing law.
The statute, as amended in 1995, was designed as a compromise be-
supra note 8, at 228-49 (discussing the increasingly punitive goals of state juvenile justice
systems, switching their emphasis from the best interest of the child to pubic safety).
214. See GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 37, at 40-49. In order to meet the needs of chil-
dren it is important for the child's placement to be made quickly and in a way that will
cause the least damage to the child's psychological well-being. Id. at 42-45. It is easy for a
child to feel abandonment when removed from his or her home. Id. at 41. Although
Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit discuss a child's placement in dependency proceedings, they
also have noted that dependency and delinquency hearings are similar in the sense that
they are determining a child's placement. Id. at 65.
215. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 76, at 51 (stating that children in Maryland committed to
Montrose School, a juvenile detention and commitment facility, were "re-adjudicated
within two years of their first admission," and that "three-quarters of the youth released
from the Hickey School in 1983 were returned to the facility within two years"). However,
when Massachusetts closed their juvenile state training schools and implemented alterna-
tive community-based programs with individualized programming, serious juvenile crime
and recidivism rates actually decreased. Id. at 52.
216. Id. at 51 (finding that sixty percent of the juveniles released from prison in Florida
were rearrested within one year, and in California, that eighty percent of the 'juveniles
released from selected California Youth Authority institutions ... were rearrested for hav-
ing committed serious crimes"). Again,jurisdictions that reformed their juvenile incarcer-
ation systems had declining recidivism rates. Id. at 53 (finding "[i]n 1972, [that] 35
percent of the adults committed to the [Massachusetts] state prison system were graduates
from the juvenile system. [But) [iun 1985, only 15 percent had been through the juvenile
system").
217. See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INsT. CODE § 726 (West 1998) (stating that a minor can be
confined up to the maximum term of imprisonment that an adult would receive for the
same penal offense).
218. See, e.g., id. § 607(b) (declaring that the juvenile court can maintain jurisdiction of
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tween those who wanted to expand the category of children subject to
waiver to criminal court by lowering the age threshold and expanding
the class of offenses subject to waiver and those opposed to such ex-
pansion of the waiver provisions.220 The compromise was a determi-
nate sentencing law which permits children between ten and sixteen
years of age who are charged with one of a dozen plus crimes to be
tried in juvenile court,2 2' but subjected to imprisonment for longer
periods than ordinary delinquents, and to be transferred to adult cor-
rectional facilities upon reaching maturity. 222  Given these recent
changes in both the practice and ideology of the juvenile justice sys-
tem, it is difficult to justify any attorney assuming a guardian role,
rather than an advocate role, when practicing in juvenile court.
Many attorneys go along with the probation department's recom-
mendation that the child remain at home under supervision.223 This
disposition seems innocuous because the child remains with his family
and the probation officer may be able to help the child.2 24 However,
the probation officer often has a caseload of one hundred or more
cases; he or she triages and spends little time with those that do not
seem to be most at risk.225 In these circumstances, it is likely that the
child will violate probation. This time around, the disposition invaria-
bly will be more harsh because the child has demonstrated that he
cannot live at home and that probation supervision, which may have
been minimal, is insufficient to help the child.226
220. Prior to 1995, the waiver provision applied only to fifteen- and sixteen-year-olds
who were charged with having committed a felony. In 1995, the age was lowered to four-
teen, if the child was alleged to have committed one of three very serious felonies, "a
capital felony, an aggravated controlled substance felony, or a felony of the first degree."
TEX. FAm. CODE ANN. § 54.02 (a) (2) (A) (Vernon 2002).
221. See id. § 53.045(a) (1)-(16). Originally the determinate sentencing law applied only
to six very serious offenses. The amendments include such offenses as, murder, capital
murder, manslaughter, aggravated kidnapping, sexual assault or aggravated sexual assault,
aggravated assault, aggravated robbery, injury to a child or an elderly or disabled person,
felony deadly conduct involving discharging a firearm, aggravated controlled substance
felony, criminal solicitation, indecency with a child, criminal solicitation of a minor, at-
tempted murder or capital murder, arson, and intoxication manslaughter. Id.
222. TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. § 61.079 (Vernon 2002) (stating that when the juvenile
is between the ages of sixteen and twenty-one, the Texas Youth Commission may seek to
transfer the child to the Texas Department of Criminal Justice if "(1) the child has not
completed the sentence; and (2) the child's conduct ... indicates that the welfare of the
community requires the transfer").
223. SELLING JUSTICE SHORT, supra note 99, at 14.
224. Id. at 28-29.
225. See Ronald P. Corbett, Jr., Juvenile Probation on the Eve of the Next Millennium, FED.
PROBATION, Dec. 1999, at 78, 79 (noting the national average caseload of 41 probationers is
generally much higher in urban locations).
226. Feld, supra note 33, at 1306-07.
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In addition to the inadequacies with home supervision recom-
mendations, there are not enough good residential treatment facili-
ties, and there are long waiting lists and strict criteria for
acceptance.227 The available residential treatment facilities are very
expensive, rivaling tuition and board at the nation's most prestigious
colleges. 228 Who pays? If the child is on Medicaid, public facilities
will often accept whatever payment Medicaid gives. 229  Above that
line, the parents must pay either from insurance or their own pocket.
Thus, parents who are part of the working poor will not be able to
afford the tuition.
Boot camps are being touted as an efficacious and less expensive
alternative. 230 These facilities are typically isolated geographically and
227. Residential treatment programs for juvenile delinquents are typically some type of
mental health program. However, the American Psychological Association stated that forty
to seventy percent of incarcerated youth have mental health problems and are not receiv-
ing treatment. See W. John Thomas et al., Race, Juvenile Justice, and Mental Health: New
Dimensions in Measuring Pervasive Bias, 89J. CRIm. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 615, 627 n.84 (1999)
(citing Am. Psychiatric Ass'n, APA Official Actions: The Psychiatrist and the Juvenile Court Sys-
tem, 147 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1584, 1584-85 (1990)). In a discussion with juvenile probation
officers in Texas, I was told that they believe over ninety percent of the juveniles who have
been adjudicated delinquents have mental health problems and should not be in the juve-
nile justice system.
When the family has health insurance to cover the cost for treatment, the child is
more likely to receive the proper care as many of the facilities are privately run by for-profit
corporations. See Dennis E. Cichon, The Ignored Population: Children in the Mental Health
System, 17 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 9, 14 (2000) (discussing the increasing number of private
facilities for treating juveniles with mental health problems).
228. A child in a residential treatment program spends an average of thirteen months in
the program at a cost of $28,678. Gary B. Sutnick, "Reasonable Efforts" Revisited: Reforming
Federal Financing of Children's Mental Health Services, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 136, 146 (1993). Juve-
nile justice commissions do not always have the money to cover the costs and will often
turn to the parents for reimbursement or medical insurance coverage. See, e.g., Psychiatric
Inst. of Washington, D.C., Inc. v. Johnson, 944 F. Supp. 5, 7 (D.D.C. 1996) (stating that
pursuant to a Virginia statute "after an investigation and hearing, the court shall order and
decree that the parent or other legally obligated person shall pay ... a reasonable sum
commensurate with the ability to pay, that will cover in whole or in part the support and
treatment of the juvenile"); In re Carlson, 176 B.R. 890, 892 (Bankr. Minn. 1995) (stating
"if the child's resources are insufficient to reimburse the County, [Minnesota statute] pro-
vides that the court must order the parents to contribute to the cost of examination, care
or treatment of the child").
229. State ex rel. Daniel M. v. West Virginia Dep't of Health & Human Res., 516 S.E.2d
30, 33 (W. Va. 1999) (explaining "pursuant to 42 C.F.R. § 456.1(b)(2) (1998), Medicaid
dollars may only be utilized for payment of inpatient treatment received by juveniles after
the independent agency has verified the medical necessity") (footnote omitted).
230. Although boot camp advocates claim this is a less expensive way of dealing with
juvenile delinquency problems, studies indicate otherwise. The Office of Juvenile Justice
and Delinquency stated that "boot camps run an average of 10 times the cost of ajuvenile
on probation." Jerry Tyler et al., Juvenile Boot Camps: A Descriptive Analysis of Program Diver-
sity and Effectiveness, 38 Soc. Sci. J. 445, 446 (2001). Costs for the administration of these
camps run from $65 per day per youth to $188 per day per youth, while probation supervi-
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have a military style curriculum. 2 3' They purportedly provide
juveniles with a rigorous, disciplined routine that encourages the
youth to accept responsibility, build self-esteem, and develop trust of
others.23 2 Juveniles are often given group punishments for violations
of rules rather than encouragement for behaving correctly.233 Some
are not licensed and thus there is little oversight and their employees
are often not sufficiently trained.2 34 There have been a number of
deaths of children in such facilities, and recently the director of such a
boot camp was indicted for murder because a fourteen-year-old died
after being required to remain in one-hundred-degree heat without
water.23 5 Another available, yet objectionable facility, is the state train-
ing school. 2 36 These facilities are lock-ups and resemble prisons.
23 7
By and large there is little medical care or schooling. 23 8 There is, how-
ever, a lot of brutality in many of these places. 239 The cases reveal
cruelty that may be even more extreme than in adult prisons.
During the 197 0s a number of class action lawsuits were brought
in federal courts to correct the deplorable conditions that existed in
juvenile locked facilities.240 In Rhode Island children were kept in
small, dark cement rooms where the only opening was a small barred
sion runs about $8.44 per day, residential placement is $88.62 per day, and a detention
facility costs $85.90 per day. Id. Another report conducted in Wisconsin indicated that the
cost for the boot camp was $6491 per youth per month as compared to $4384-4897 for
locked youth facilities in the state. Joshua Morby, Report on Boot Camp is Critical. Data Sug-
gest the Program May Not Be Effective in Reducing Recidivism Rates, Wis. ST. J., Mar. 9, 2001, at
B1.
231. Morby, supra note 230.
232. See Tyler et al., supra note 230, at 449, 458.
233. See MARGARET BEVER, JUVENILE BOOT CAMPS DON'T MAKE SENSE, at http://
www.abanet.org/crimjust/juvjus/cjbootcamp.html (1996) (discussing how teenagers are
especially resistant to "unfair" treatment like group punishment that is widely used in boot
camp facilities).
234. Tyler et al., supra note 230, at 449.
235. Associated Press, Boot Camp Chief Held In Boy's Death, L.A. TIMEs, Feb. 16, 2002, at
A20.
236. See supra note 10 (citing state definitions of "training schools"); cf. In re Lavette M.,
316 N.E.2d 314, 317 (N.Y. 1974) (stating that a training school, a locked facility, is proper
even for a person in need of supervision (PINS) as long as proper treatment is provided).
237. See Inmates of the Boys' Training Sch. v. Affleck, 346 F. Supp. 1354, 1359-61 (D.R.I.
1972) (describing the conditions of the training school); Lollis v. N.Y. State Dep't of Soc.
Servs., 322 F. Supp. 473, 475-76 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (describing the child's room conditions).
238. See Affleck, 346 F. Supp. at 1359, 1361; Jennifer Warren, Suit Assails Conditions at
Youth Prisons, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 25, 2002, at B8 (giving examples of deficient medical care
and limited educational programming).
239. See Nelson v. Heyne, 491 F.2d 352, 354 (7th Cir. 1974) (citing routine beatings
administered by staff members); Morales v. Turman, 364 F. Supp. 166, 169-73 (E.D. Tex.
1973) (finding that staff members routinely administered physical beatings, including
blows to the face, and used tear gas).
240. See Nelson, 491 F.2d at 353; Morales, 364 F. Supp. at 169; Affleck, 346 F. Supp. at 1357.
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window. 241 Often the window was boarded up and with no artificial
lighting, the room would be totally dark.24 2 In one of the buildings,
the children were allowed out of their cells only for a daily shower and
to receive their meals which had to be eaten in their cell.24" The chil-
dren were unable to exercise. 2 4 Many children would receive noth-
ing to eat for sixteen hours, as the last meal of the day was given at
three o'clock in the afternoon, and no other food was provided until
seven o'clock the next morning.245 Lack of education was another
major problem. 24 6 The state provided only one and a half to two
hours of education a day, which consisted mostly of math problems.247
Visitors were also limited, and many children went months without
being able to see their parents or other relatives.248
Facilities in Indiana, 249 Texas, 250 and New York251 were not any
better. In Indiana, children were disciplined by being severely beaten
with a thick paddle and subjected to intramuscular injections of tran-
quilizing drugs Sparine and Thorazine, designed for psychotic pa-
tients, which were administered to the juveniles, not for psychiatric
purposes, but solely to control their behavior.252 Proper medical
treatment was not provided and the dose of tranquilizer was generally
the same for all the inmates, regardless of weight. 255 Similar condi-
tions existed in Texas.254 Children were disciplined by a system called
"racking" where ajuvenile was forced to stand against the wall with his
hands in his pockets, while the guard would beat him on the face and
body with a closed fist.255 Another form of discipline was to have the
juveniles do "make-work tasks," such as pulling grass without bending
their knees for hours on end.256 In New York, children were disci-
241. See Affleck, 346 F. Supp. at 1359.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 1359, 1361.
245. Id. at 1360.
246. Id. at 1361.
247. Id. at 1359, 1361.
248. Id. at 1360-61.
249. See Nelson v. Heynes, 491 F.2d 352, 353-54, 356-58 (7th Cir. 1974).
250. See Morales v. Turman, 535 F.2d 864, 867-69 (5th Cir. 1976), rev'd on other grounds,
430 U.S. 988 (1977).
251. SeeLollis v. N.Y. State Dep't ofSoc. Servs., 328 F. Supp. 1115, 1117 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
252. Nelson, 491 F.2d at 354, 356.
253. Id. at 356 n.9 (citing the standard order proscribing 25 milligrams of Sparine for
"an emotionally upset boy under 116 pounds," and 50 milligrams of Sparine for any child
over that weight).
254. See Morales, 535 F.2d at 867-69.
255. Morales v. Turman, 364 F. Supp. 166, 170 (E.D. Tex. 1973).
256. Id. at 172.
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plined by being held in isolation cells, often for weeks.25 7 The cells
were bare except for a mattress at night.
2 51
Have these conditions changed? Recently a suit was filed against
the California Youth Authority (CYA) alleging some of these same
conditions.2 59 Young offenders are forcibly given mind-altering drugs
while being denied proper psychiatric care. 260 They are sometimes
placed in small "metal cages," where, the CYA contends, the youths
are given educational opportunities and exercise.261 Children are al-
legedly raped by other inmates and are not protected by the
guards.262 In 2001, Maryland began to phase out two juvenile deten-
tion facilities due to similar conditions.263 In Louisiana, the state took
over the operations of a privately run juvenile facility because of the
appalling conditions,264 which still existed months after the state took
control.2 6 5 Juveniles are disciplined with extreme force and sufficient
education is still not provided.266
Can anyone say that such facilities are in a child's best interests?
It is true that there are dangerous children who must be incarcerated
to protect society, but nothing requires that they be abused. Protect-
ing society is the same rationale given for sentencing adult defendants
to prison. 267 Prison sentences may protect society, but no one claims
that incarceration is in the adult offender's best interests.
The role of an attorney in juvenile court was perhaps best ex-
pressed by Justice Fortas in Kent v. United States, which held that a
child being considered for waiver to adult criminal court is entitled to
a hearing, an attorney with access to probation files, and a statement
257. See Lollis v. N.Y. State Dep't of Soc. Servs., 322 F. Supp. 473, 475-76 (S.D.N.Y. 1970)
(finding that the child was held in an isolation cell for two weeks, and quite likely would
have been held longer if not for the intervention of the judge that found her during a
routine visit).
258. Id. at 476.
259. Warren, supra note 238.
260. Id.
261. Id. It is unclear how the authorities actually expect children to exercise in such
small quarters.
262. Id.
263. Maureen O'Hagan, Maryland to Phase Out Troubled Youth Center; Most Juveniles to
Move to Community Programs, WASH. POST, Dec. 28, 2001, at B04.
264. See Fox Butterfield, Settling Suit, Louisiana Abandons Private Youth Prisons, N.Y. TIMEs,
Sept. 8, 2000, at A14 (explaining that children were beaten by the guards regularly, denied
food and clothing, and were not provided proper medical treatment).
265. See Joe Gyan, Jr., Judge Frees Youth, Blasts Prison, ADVOCATE, Dec. 20, 2001, at 6-B
(citing the continued violence in the youth prison, even after the state was running the
facility).
266. Id.
267. See Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 189-90 (1988) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (allud-
ing to the fact that sentences can serve to protect society from the violent defendant).
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detailing the reasons for the transfer. 268 The circuit court of appeals
in the case had justified the denial of access to probation reports on
the ground that it was not counsel's role to "denigrate" probation rec-
ommendations.269 In reversing, the Supreme Court stated, "it is pre-
cisely the role of counsel to 'denigrate' such matter. '270 Justice Fortas
eloquently noted that "[t] he right to representation by counsel is not
a formality. It is not a grudging gesture to a ritualistic requirement. It
is of the essence of justice."' 27' This moving description of counsel's
role is not merely flowery rhetoric. Rather, the provision of adequate
counsel is of profound importance to the well-being of children in
juvenile court.
III. HOLISTIC LAWYERING
The model of holistic lawyering that I propose permits, and in-
deed requires the lawyer to act as a lawyer. While zealous advocacy
informs the entire model, the attorney also is associated with other
professionals in a team. The combined skills of each team member
contribute to the kind of advocacy that truly ensures the best interests
of the child. This model requires money, access to professionals in
other disciplines, a keen appreciation of the dangers of the juvenile
court system, attitudinal changes regarding the attorney child-client
relationship, the necessity for adversarial representation, and exper-
tise in child development and criminal, juvenile, and civil court law
and practice. Even attorneys with limited means can employ aspects
of this model. The differences between the ideal and real worlds are
more in degree than in kind, and, as with most things, ultimately rest
on the extent of available resources.
A. Ideal Holistic Lawyering
1. The Value of a Team Approach.--Simply stated, my proposal of
ideal holistic lawyering for minors charged with juvenile delinquency
encompasses a team approach. The team should include attorneys
who specialize in juvenile law, social workers, educators, therapists,
psychologists, psychiatrists, investigators, and criminal and civil law at-
torneys who work together to provide high quality representation for
the child-client.
268. 383 U.S. 541, 561-63 (1966) (stating the child's "rights are meaningless-an illu-
sion, a mockery-unless counsel is given an opportunity to function").
269. Kent v. United States, 343 F.2d 247, 258 (D.C. Cir. 1965), rev'd, 383 U.S. 541.
270. Kent, 383 U.S. at 563. The Court granted counsel access to probation reports
"within reasonable limits having regard to the theory of the Juvenile Court Act." Id.
271. Id. at 561.
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This is not a new concept. For years the medical profession has
used a team approach to treat patients, particularly those with can-
cer.27 2 As medicine has become more complex and specialized and
our knowledge expands, it is impossible for one doctor to know and
do everything. Doctors must rely not only on other doctors, such as
radiologists, surgeons, anestheologists, but also nurses, x-ray techni-
cians, nutritionists and social workers.27 No one thinks twice about
the medical team approach, and indeed, a patient would undoubtedly
question its absence.
Social service agencies also use a team approach, or as it is more
formally termed, vertical case management.274 This collaborative ef-
fort assists clients in getting the maximum benefits.275 By bringing in
various disciplines, such as law and medicine, social workers have
found that they are better able to help clients solve their multifaceted
problems. 27
6
Legal matters present the same kinds of difficulties. Law has be-
come increasingly specialized, reflecting increasingly complex legal is-
sues. A lawyer may specialize not only in one area of the law, but also
in only one aspect of the specialized field. A criminal lawyer, for ex-
ample, may be an expert in Fourth Amendment issues, but know very
little about the insanity defense. The lawyer specializing in the in-
sanity defense will, of course, bring in medical experts to develop and
present the defense. Corporate attorneys will use certified public ac-
countants (CPAs) to defend clients accused of accounting fraud. In-
deed, corporate attorneys have been using a form of holistic lawyering
272. See Francea L. McNair, At-Home Rehabilitation of Pediatric Cancer Patients: A Team Ap-
proach, 5 HEALTH & Soc. WORK, May 1980, at 50, 51-54 (discussing the work of teams in the
care of pediatric cancer patients); Jeanne Teresi et al., A Primary Care Nursing Model in Long-
Term Care Facilities: Evaluation of Impact on Affect, Behavior, and Socialization, 33 GERONTOLO-
GIST 667, 667-74 (1993) (discussing the utilization of a professional team of caregivers in a
geriatric facility).
273. See, e.g., McNair, supra note 272, at 50 (listing some of the many professionals that
may participate on a pediatric cancer patient's team).
274. See Rocco A. Cimmarustic, Family Preservation Practice Based Upon A Multisystem Ap-
proach, CHILD & ADOLESCENT SOC. WoRKJ., Aug. 1992, at 277-88; Mark Krueger, Making the
Team Approach Work in Residential Group Care, 66 CHILD WELFARE 447, 449-57 (1987) (recom-
mending the structural framework for a team approach); McNair, supra note 272, at 50
(explaining how social workers, as well as doctors, are members of pediatric cancer pa-
tients' team).
275. See McNair, supra note 272, at 50-51 (explaining the vital benefits of a team
approach).
276. See Annie G. Steinberg et al., Child-Centered, Vertically Structured, and Interdisciplinary:
An Integrative Approach to Children's Policy, Practice, and Research, 40 FAM. CT. REv. 116, 117
(2002) (discussing the combination of law, medicine, and social work to help address the
various problems faced by children).
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for many years-commonly termed Multi-Disciplinary Practices
(MDP) 277 -and the American Bar Association's Commission on Mul-
tidisciplinary Practices (CMP) has given its imprimatur of approval to
these approaches.2 78 Historically, accounting firms expanded the ser-
vices they offered clients to include estate and financial planning, ac-
quisitions and mergers, and mediation. 279  As the firms were
supplying assistance in areas that were traditionally provided by law-
yers, these firms recruited attorneys to work within the firm and assist
with the provision of these services.28 ° On the criminal side, the O.J.
Simpson case is a paradigm of holistic lawyering-the "dream team"
of attorneys, private detectives, DNA experts, psychologists, and jury
consultants. 281  Indeed, the ABA Standards of Criminal Justice state
that:
Quality legal representation cannot be rendered either by
defenders or by assigned counsel unless the lawyers have
available for their use adequate supporting services. These
include .. .expert witnesses... , personnel skilled in social
work and related disciplines to provide assistance at pretrial
release hearings and at sentencings, and trained investiga-
tors to interview witnesses and to assemble demonstrative evi-
dence. The quality of representation at trial, for example,
may be excellent and yet valueless to the defendant if the
277. Janet Stidman Eveleth, Lawyers Practicing Law with Non-Lawyers?, MD. B.J.,Jan./Feb.
2001, at 40, 41-42. In these practices, lawyers and non-lawyers provide various services for
clients, such as legal services by the attorneys and accounting services by non-lawyers. Id. at
41.
278. Id. at 42. Although the CMP has supported this concept, the American Bar Associa-
tion's House of Delegates, after much debate, passed a resolution to prohibit the sharing
of fees and ownership of the firm by lawyers with non-lawyers. Id. at 43. Individual state
bar associations are also reviewing this matter and are choosing to support the concept. Id.
at 42.
279. Id. at 42.
280. Id. "The concept of MDPs has been hotly debated" and discussed in relation to
corporate matters and particularly in regard to "[t]he 'big five' accounting firms." Id. at
4142. Its application to non-profit legal services agencies or criminal representation has
not been a major topic of discussion. There are, however, many advantages for indigent
clients to have accessibility to "one-stop shopping" for social and legal services. See Stacy L.
Brustin, Legal Services Provision Through Multi-Disciplinary Practice-Encouraging Holistic Advo-
cacy While Protecting Ethical Interests, 73 U. COLO. L. REv. 787 (2002) (weighing the ethical
concerns of MDP against the benefits to clients of legal services corporations).
281. See Peter Arenella, Foreword: OJ Lessons, 69 S. CAL. L. REv. 1233, 1235 (1996) ("The
'trial of the century' . .. hire[d] some of this country's leading medical, forensic, and legal
experts before Simpson was even arrested."); Laura Oren, Righting Child Custody Wrongs:
The Children of the "Disappeared" in Argentina, 14 HARv. HuM. RTs. J. 123, 138-43 (2001)
(discussing the use of genetic testing to reunite the children of "disappeared" parents with
their grandparents, another example of holistic lawyering).
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defense requires the assistance of a psychiatrist or handwrit-
ing expert and no such services are available.
28 2
How would this approach play out for attorneys representing chil-
dren in delinquency matters? As noted above, representation of chil-
dren charged with crimes is no easy job. Juvenile court procedures
are usually termed civil matters;2 3 that requires the attorney to know
civil law-how to preserve the record, 2 4 motions, discovery, rules of
appellate practice, etc. 28 5 The reality, however, is that the child is
charged with committing a penal offense, 2 6 and therefore the attor-
ney must know both substantive criminal law and criminal procedure.
But that is not enough. The attorney must also know juvenile law and
practice, which may differ from both civil and criminal law. If the
child is found guilty, dispositional alternatives become critical.2 7 The
attorney cannot rely on an overworked probation officer to explore all
possibilities. The attorney needs a social worker who is experienced
282. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 5-1.4 cmt. (1986).
283. See, e.g., TEX. FKAM. CODE ANN. § 56.01 (a) (Vernon 2002) (stating that ajuvenile has
a right to appeal an order from a juvenile court in the court of appeals and the Texas
Supreme Court according to the requirements for civil appeals).
284. Cf Reasoner v. State, 463 S.W.2d 55, 59-60 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971). In Reasoner, the
court stated that the child's counsel waived the right to claim an unlawful search and
seizure because the attorney neglected to object to evidence being offered by the state and
subsequently argued his motion to suppress. Id. The trial court treated the motion to
suppress as a motion in limine, which in civil practice, unlike criminal practice, requires an
objection when the contested evidence is offered into the record. Id.
285. Although these are denominated civil proceedings, the courts will often deny the
alleged delinquent the benefits of civil rules of procedure because delinquency cases are
quasi-criminal in nature. See TEX. FAm. CODE ANN. § 51.17(a)-(b) (Vernon 2002) (provid-
ing that although the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure in general apply to delinquency pro-
ceedings, Criminal Rules of Procedure, which are not expansive, cover discovery in
delinquency cases); S.D.G. v. State, 936 S.W.2d 371, 385 (Tex. App. 1996) (holding the
rules of civil discovery are not compatible with the purpose and nature ofjuvenile proceed-
ings); In re M.A.G., 541 S.W.2d 899, 900-01 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976) (even though delin-
quency proceedings are generally governed by the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure,
adopting a rule of criminal procedure permits appellate courts to dismiss cases of
fugitives).
286. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 602(a) (West Supp. 2002) (stating that any person
under the age of eighteen who "violates any law of this state or of the United States or any
ordinance of any city or county of this state defining crime other than an ordinance estab-
lishing a curfew based solely on age, is within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court"); FLA.
STAT. A.NN. § 984.03(11) (West Supp. 2002) (defining a delinquent as a child who "is found
by a court to have committed a violation of law"); 705 ILL. CoMp. STAT. ANN. 405/5-105 (3)
(West Supp. 2002) (describing a delinquent minor as one "who prior to his or her 17th
birthday has violated or attempted to violate .... any federal or State law, county or
municipal ordinance"); N.Y. FAm. CT. Acr § 311.1(2) (McKinney 1999) (declaring that a
juvenile court petition "shall charge at least one crime"); TEX. FAM. CODE ATN. § 51.03(a)
(Vernon 2002) (explaining that delinquent conduct is "conduct, other than a traffic of-
fense, that violates a penal law").
287. PURITZ ET A.., supra note 114, at 36-38.
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in such matters and knows of private treatment facilities that are spe-
cially geared for the child's particular problem and that are less
prison-like. Psychiatrists and psychologists will provide necessary in-
formation on the particular child's intelligence and emotional state,
the differences in child development, and how to communicate effec-
tively with minor children. Educational specialists can determine why
the child hates school and is doing poorly there. While some such
services are provided by the juvenile courts, there is often a long wait-
ing period to receive them, and these professionals, paid by the state,
are not always sympathetic to the child's perspective. 28 8 Furthermore,
they are not available on a day to day basis to assist the attorney and
child in communicating.
289
In one case, I represented a young girl whose mother had remar-
ried and the girl, Joan, did not get along with her step-father. In addi-
tion, she was required to spend a lot of time babysitting a new sibling.
Joan ran away from home and in the process was arrested for joyrid-
ing. She was found guilty, and the question at the dispositional hear-
ing was Joan's placement. Many of the typical teenage-parent
problems were present; however, despite the parents' ambivalence,
Joan did want to return home.
I arranged for a local psychologist to interview Joan, and with
Joan's consent, to talk with the mother and step-father. The psycholo-
gist discussed a program he had developed in another community
that he believed would meet the needs of Joan and her family. He
explained to Joan what would be involved and received her input re-
garding the workability of the program. Joan agreed it was something
she wanted to try. At this stage, the parents agreed it was best forJoan
to remain with them. The probation department, on the other hand,
was recommending placement in a group home. The psychologist tes-
tified to the appropriateness of the suggested plan and Joan's willing-
ness to cooperate. Joan was able to take the stand and intelligently
discuss what was involved in the treatment program for her, her
mother, and step-father. She also clearly indicated her involvement
288. See Steinberg et al., supra note 276, at 117-18 (discussing the failures of juvenile
justice services).
289. "Except for the zealous representation that can be expected of community legal
services attorneys, [court-assigned] counsel are frequently ineffective and unskilled, and
give their clients less than their full effort." Martin Guggenheim, The Right to Be Represented
but Not Heard: Reflections on Legal Representation for Children, 59 N.Y.U. L. REv. 76, 140 (1984)
(footnote omitted). Given that court-appointed counsel frequently give their clients less
than zealous representation, by analogy, court-appointed psychiatrists or psychologists, un-
less committed to providing community psychiatric or psychological services, may not be
inclined to devote their full effort either.
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with the development of the plan and her acceptance of it. The
judge, who routinely followed the probation department's recommen-
dation, was impressed with the psychologist's andJoan's participation.
She permitted Joan to remain at home, and ordered her and the fam-
ily to engage in the program with this particular psychologist.
Even in cases that do not appear to need the use of experts, the
attorney's lack of knowledge can affect the representation the client
receives. Once, a criminal defense lawyer appeared in juvenile court
with a sixteen-year-old client charged with driving under the influ-
ence. The child told his attorney that he had failed the sobriety test
because he had dyslexia. The attorney relayed this information to the
prosecutor, who then invited the defense attorney to watch a video-
tape of the sobriety test. As the tape was played, the district attorney
commented that the juvenile had not been asked to read anything
and had not reversed any letters or numbers, and therefore, dyslexia
had nothing to do with the minor failing the sobriety test. The de-
fense attorney agreed, and stated he did not know what his client was
talking about or why he had insisted that dyslexia caused him to fail
the test. Based on the tape, the attorney advised the prosecutor that
he would convince his client to plead guilty.
There are several indications of poor lawyering in this incident,
whether the client is an adult or a child. The attorney did not ask his
client how the dyslexia affected his ability to pass the sobriety test, and
even if he had, a child is unlikely to be able to explain fully the con-
nection between dyslexia and the sobriety test. Since the attorney had
no knowledge of learning disabilities, particularly dyslexia, he was se-
verely disadvantaged in his discussions with the prosecutor. Had the
defense attorney consulted with an expert, he would have learned that
some types of dyslexia can also affect eye-hand coordination in such a
way as to make the person appear intoxicated.2 90
A common occurrence, especially when representing children ac-
cused of crime, is that the client will say that he has an alibi witness,
but only knows his first name, or, more frequently, his street name,
"Speedy." An investigator can question the child regarding the streets
or stores that Speedy frequents or the kids with whom he associates. I
remember vividly several cases in which our investigator, an ex-police
290. NAT'L CTR. FOR LEARNING DISABILITIES, DYSPRAXIA, at http://www.ncld.org/info/
indepth/dyspraxia.cfm (last visited Dec. 22, 2002). There are several learning disabilities
that people tend to categorize as dyslexia. One of these is dyspraxia which causes coordi-
nation problems, confusion about which hand to use for tasks, poor sense of direction,




officer, against all odds, had ferreted out the alibi witness that the
prosecution had sarcastically called the phantom witness. Another
scenario that repeats itself in juvenile court is clients who will only
mumble "yes" or "no," or worse, "I don't know" and "I don't remem-
ber," or worst of all, total silence. A trained child psychologist can
draw the child out, and make it easier for the attorney to get the req-
uisite information.29'
Unlike many portraits from the eighteenth century, children are
not merely miniature adults. People who, in other contexts recognize
and relate to children differently than to adults, when faced with crim-
inal activities by juveniles, suddenly no longer see the child as a child,
but rather as a super-predator adult criminal deserving of adult pun-
ishment.2 2 If the juvenile court system is a recognition that children
are different from adults, and that the best interests of the child must
govern, lawyers for child-clients must utilize the skills of all profession-
als who can help to bridge the gap between adult and child.
2. The Dynamics of Ideal Holistic Lawyeing.-To get the full bene-
fits of such a team approach, it must be structured in such a way as to
assure that the professional participants freely interact with each other
and provide optimal input. Studies show that when professional
teams are hierarchically structured with the doctor or lawyer at the
top, the other professional team members are more reluctant to speak
out, and the patient or client has less control over his treatment or
representation. 21' Group members may avoid this problem by voting
on the leader, or making decisions based on a majority vote. Ethical
problems, however, may result from such practices. The attorney
must ultimately rely on his or her own professional judgment in repre-
senting a client,294 regardless of what other team members conclude
when, in his or her view, such conclusions may be detrimental to the
child's legal defenses.29 5 Indeed, the United States Supreme Court
291. It is difficult for an attorney to know all aspects of child development. A good child
psychologist who understands child and adolescent development can help in interviewing
the child-client.
292. See PURITZ ET AL., supra note 114, at 34 (noting the legislative trend towards classify-
ing more juvenile crimes as adult crimes).
293. See Jennifer Luntz, Some Problems of Being a Professional on a Team, 36 AUSTRALIAN
Soc. WORK 15-16 (1983); Helena Temkin-Greener, Interprofessional Perspectives on Team in
Health Care: A Case Study, 61 MILBANK MEM'L FUND Q. HEALTH & Soc'Y 641, 649-50 (1983).
294. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.4(c) (2002); MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RE-
SPONSIBILITY DR 5-107(B) (1999).
295. See Lisa A. Stanger, Note, Conflicts Between Attorneys and Social Workers Representing
Children in Delinquency Proceedings, 65 FoRDHAM L. REV. 1123, 1135-40 (1996) (explaining
that independent zealous representation must outweigh all other assessments).
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has held in Jones v. Barnes,2 9 6 that an attorney need not obey even the
client's directive to pursue or raise even non-frivolous claims, 29 v not-
withstanding Faretta's ruling permitting defendants to represent them-
selves in criminal cases.298
The permissibility of such a hierarchical arrangement between at-
torney and client allowed by Jones is perplexing, particularly after the
Faretta decision. 299 If the accused may dispense with counsel alto-
gether, surely after being advised of the options, he or she must make
the ultimate decisions affecting their representation, as long as it does
not involve committing a crime,3 ° ° providing ineffective assistance of
counsel, 0 or impinging on the lawyer's ability to make instantaneous
trial decisions.30 2
Does the fact that the client is a child change my view? In gen-
eral, no. Children, when properly informed of all matters by the
team, can make good decisions regarding their representation. Un-
less there are compelling circumstances, the child, if he or she wishes,
should be present for team meetings and have access to reports. 30 3
The issues must be explained in a way that is child-friendly, and the
client should be urged to provide feedback and direction to team
296. 463 U.S. 745 (1983).
297. Id. at 753-54.
298. 422 U.S. 806, 819-20 (1975).
299. Post-Faretta law has, however, limited the right to self-representation. See McKaskle
v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 173-74 (1984) (holding that Faretta does not preclude the ap-
pointment of standby counsel even over defendant's objection, and that there is no right
to "hybrid" representation). Furthermore, the trial court, in its discretion, may impose
separate counsel over a defendant's objection to avoid a conflict of interest. See Wheat v.
United States, 486 U.S. 153, 163 (1988) (upholding the lower court's decision refusing the
petitioner's request to substitute his counsel with the co-defendant's counsel in an effort to
protect himself). The defendant, however, is bound by counsel's errors. Taylor v. Illinois,
484 U.S. 400, 417-18 (1988); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87 (1977). Of course, if
counsel's errors are sufficiently egregious and prejudicial, defendant's Sixth Amendment
right to effective assistance of counsel is violated. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,
686 (1984). Compare my views on this issue with respect to children being able to waive
counsel where I take the position that Faretta should not apply to children in juvenile
court. Supra notes 173-174 and accompanying text,
300. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d) (2002) (prohibiting an attorney
from engaging or assisting in a client's criminal or fraudulent conduct).
301. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686.
302. See Wainwright, 433 U.S. at 94 (Burger, CJ., concurring) (noting that "trial deci-
sions are of necessity entrusted to the accused's attorney").
303. See supra notes 173-174 and accompanying text (advocating the mandatory assign-
ment of counsel without the possibility of waiver). Children who are retarded or psychotic
might be unable to make these ultimate decisions, but even with respect to such children,
individual evaluations should be made. Therefore, any reports that may be psychologically
damaging to the child should be discussed individually with the child prior to the team
meeting. The discussion should be handled by an expert, a psychologist or other mental
health worker, and explained carefully to the child in order to do the least harm possible.
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members. Children in juvenile court often do not understand what is
happening to them, what the possible consequences are, or how se-
lecting different choices can affect their lives. At the very least, chil-
dren in juvenile court have to be kept informed. Many children will
ultimately ask the lawyer to make the decision, particularly when the
juvenile is very young. That is fine, because the child is deciding to let
the lawyer decide. What is important is that the child knows he or she
has a say in the outcome. Of course, the older the child, the greater
the likelihood that the child, after being informed, will elect to make
the ultimate decision. Realistically, however, based on my experience,
almost all children, even older adolescents, will elect to follow their
attorney's recommendation."0 4 That too is fine, because the child is
still the decisionmaker.
However, if the attorney agrees with this view of lawyering in the
juvenile court, he or she must be careful not to unduly influence the
client. Children naturally look to authority figures to make decisions
for them."°5 If the attorney under the guise of providing information
overwhelms the child, he or she implicitly becomes a guardian rather
than a lawyer.3 0 6 For example, consider an attorney that is represent-
ing a child charged with a hate crime. The child sees nothing wrong
with his actions since his parents, who are anti-Semitic, supported his
decision to paint a swastika on ajewish classmate's garage. The lawyer
is appalled by the child-client's actions and thinks it would be good for
the child to be removed from his home environment lest he grows up
to be a violent "skinhead." Although the lawyer may want to influence
his client and encourage him to take responsibility for his actions, if
he believes there is a lack of evidence and that he could get a dismis-
sal, the lawyer needs to present this information to the child in an
unbiased fashion and live with the outcome of the trial.
304. Cf Glen Heathers, Acquiring Dependence and Independence, in READINGS IN THE PSY-
CHOLOGY OF CHILDHOOD AND ADOLESCENCE 382, 382-83 (William J. Meyer ed., 1967) (ex-
plaining that people depend on others for assistance when they are unable to satisfy their
needs).
305. See ERIK H. ERIKSON, CHILDHOOD AND SOCIETY 265-83 (1950) (discussing the psycho-
logical development of children with regard to their sense of self, independence, and place
in a social community). While adolescents often have a strong desire to be independent,
they also want the approval and support of the adult figures around them. This creates
confusion for the child, and he or she will be more likely to turn to authority figures for
decision making in times of stress. Id.; see also Heathers, supra note 304, at 382-93 (describ-
ing the emotional dependence of adolescents and their need for affection and approval
particularly in situations of conflict and stress).
306. Lourdes M. Rosado, Note, Minors and the Fourth Amendment: How Juvenile Status
Should Invoke Different Standards for Searches and Seizures on the Street, 71 N.Y.U. L. REv. 762,
790 (1996). (explaining that children immediately accept rules and laws as societal man-
dates, rather than understanding the underlying principles and deciding for themselves).
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This viewpoint is not shared by all. Indeed, the high profile ag-
gressive criminal defense attorney Leslie Abramson claims:
With adults, it's ethically appropriate to do whatever your cli-
ent wants, so long as it's legal .... But when it's a kid who's
being wrongheaded, you have to recognize that the child
doesn't necessarily have the maturity to make wise choices.
You overrule him when necessary. And you try to do some-
thing that will make his life better, even if he doesn't see the
logic. 30 7
In my idealistic model, all members of the team should under-
stand and appreciate the importance of the child-client directing his
or her own representation within the proper parameters. The team
approach also has to overcome the normative differences within vari-
ous professional disciplines. For example, the lawyer's role is to pro-
vide zealous advocacy.3"' A mental health worker seeks the client's
best interests.3 °9 Sometimes the two coincide, but sometimes, they do
not, or at least do not appear to. Suppose a child charged with com-
mitting a criminal act tells his representational team that he is guilty,
but wants to "get off' and remain at home, notwithstanding severe
abuse by his parents, information that he wishes to keep secret.310 Be-
cause of his or her advocacy view of representation, the lawyer's duty
may be to keep the information confidential 3 l and to try to get an
acquittal, or failing that, probation while the child lives at home. The
social worker's professional responsibility is to report the abuse so that
the child is moved to a protective environment. 312 It is not that all
social workers believe that removal of the child is necessary in all cases
of abuse, and indeed, they know that some alternative placements can
307. LESLIE ABRAMSON, THE DEFENSE Is READY. LIFE IN THE TRENCHES OF CRIMINAL LAW
105 (1997).
308. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.3 cmt. 1 (2002); MODEL CODE OF PROF'L
RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-1 (2000).
309. See CODE OF ETHICS OF THE NAT'L ASS'N OF Soc. WORKERS Standards 1.01-.02
(1999), available at http://www.socialworkers.org/pubs/code/code.asp (last visited Dec.
22, 2002) (stating that the "clients' interests are primary," and that "[s]ocial workers may
limit clients' right to self-determination when, in the social workers' professional judg-
ment, clients' actions or potential actions pose a serious, foreseeable, and imminent risk to
themselves or others").
310. This is not an uncommon scenario. Elsewhere, I have argued that such communi-
cations must be kept confidential. Marrus, supra note 79, at 538-45.
311. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a) (forbidding disclosure of informa-
tion without client's consent); see also MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 4-1, DR 4-
101 (A)-(B) (explaining the ethical obligation of keeping the client's secrets).
312. See CODE OF ETHICS OF THE NAT'L ASS'N OF Soc. WORKERS Standards 1.01-.02 (ex-
plaining the duty of social workers to protect the well-being of their clients).
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be extremely destructive for a child as well. 31"- However, their code of
ethics requires that the information be relayed to the court.31 4 Under
some circumstances, some social workers may instinctively urge that
the child plead guilty to the alleged offense so that the child will re-
main within the court's jurisdiction, thus actively opposing a trial that
may result in an acquittal or a disposition that results in the child re-
maining at home.
In my view, the attorney's mandate to protect confidential com-
munications must trump the social worker's code of ethics. Thus, pro-
fessionals who want to be part of the representational team must also
include themselves in the attorney-client confidential relationship.
Without that adherence, the child-client may be unwilling to speak
freely with all members of the team. In addition, confidentiality by all
members of the team would be important for the attorney too and
would accomplish the purposes of a team approach. If confidentiality
is not preserved, the attorney will not feel comfortable releasing infor-
mation to the team members. At Legal Services for Children in San
Francisco, each child-client is assigned a social worker and an attor-
ney.315 The confidential relationship exists between the child-client,
the attorney and the social worker, and between the social worker and
attorney. 6
This is not an easy approach to representation. It takes time and
energy on the part of all individuals involved. The gathering of infor-
mation, strategic planning, and discussing options with the client will
take time in order to ensure that the client has the greatest degree of
involvement possible.3 17 The team should be viewed as a group of
313. See id. (explaining that social workers' ethical codes allow for them to make a pro-
fessional judgment as to what is in the client's best interest).
314. Id. Standard 1.01. In most states, social workers and other mental health profes-
sionals, differ from attorneys in that they must mandatorily report child abuse. See Marrus,
supra note 79, at 515-20 (discussing the state of the law with regard to mandatory report-
ing); see also Paula Galowitz, Collaboration Between Lawyers and Social Workers: Re-Examining the
Nature and Potential of the Relationship, 67 FORDHAM L. REv. 2123, 2135-37 (1999) (compar-
ing the ethical codes of attorneys and social workers with regard to confidentiality, disclo-
sure, and reporting).
315. LEGAL SERVS. FOR CHILDREN, INC., ANNUAL REPORT 2000, at 5 (2000), available at
http://www.lsc-sf.org/resources/LSCreport.pdf (last visited Dec. 22, 2002).
316. See Stanger, supra note 295, at 1143 (discussing the codes of conduct for attorneys
and social workers). See generally Galowitz, supra note 314, at 2147-53 (explaining ways in
which to remove the ethical impediments between team members).
317. See generally Steinberg et al., supra note 276, at 131 (addressing some of the conse-
quences of added communications across differing disciplines). I personally have found
that the more time I was able to take to explain the process and options to my child-client,
the better he or she could make informed decisions about the case. Often, these decisions
coincided with my own views.
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professionals with different expertise working together to provide
high quality representation to the child-client. If the focus is placed
on the child-client and the provision of quality services, the method
can be both effective for the client and cost effective in the long
run.3" 8 Although more time will be needed to work up a case and
there will be case strategy meetings involving several parties at once,
the end result should be better outcomes and more realistic disposi-
tional placements. Perhaps most importantly, the child-client comes
to believe in his own value as a person capable of making decisions
and directing professionals in their representation of his interests.
Is there a downside to my model of holistic lawyering, particularly
if it results in a factually guilty child's acquittal? While it may be dis-
tasteful for some to facilitate such a result, I view it as no worse than
doing the same for an adult defendant. Indeed, an argument could
be made that "getting children off' in juvenile court is even more im-
portant than in adult criminal court. Many children commit criminal
acts, even serious ones, and then outgrow their impulsive behavior
even without juvenile court intervention. 19 In fact, it is more likely
that the child will develop normally without the labeling and incarcer-
ation that the juvenile court imposes.320 Studies show that children
adjudicated delinquents are more likely to become recidivists as
adults.
3 2 1
318. See Stanger, supra note 295, at 1133-35 (explaining the benefits of social workers
and attorneys working together for the alleged juvenile delinquent).
319. SeeJuvwNILE COURT CENTENNIAL INITIATIVE: FACT SHEETS, JUVENILE COURT: GADu-
ATES, available at http://ojjdp.ncjrs.org/jcci/fgrad.html (last visited Dec. 22, 2002) (provid-
ing a number of stories of individuals who changed the course of their lives because they
were given a second chance). For example, Bob Beamon was recently named one of the
top athletes of the twentieth century, having "shattered the world-record in the long jump
at the Mexico City Olympics" in 1968. Id. As a sixteen-year-old he had been involved in
gangs and had committed several petty criminal acts. He contributes his ability to turn his
life around to his grandmother and "a juvenile court judge who gave him a second
chance." Id. Terrence Hallinan has been elected to two terms as district attorney in San
Francisco, California. Id. As a teenager he often got into fights, ended up in juvenile hall
and expelled from high school. Id. Reggie Walton grew up in a "steel mill town in rural
Pennsylvania." Id There were often fights, but when he saw a friend stabbed and almost
die, he decided to alter his path. He went to law school, became the nation's first Deputy
Drug Czar, a White House Advisor on Crime to President Bush, and is now a federal judge.
Id.
320. See id (illustrating that a child's delinquent behavior, without incarceration, does
not necessarily translate to the same type of behavior as an adult).
321. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 76, at 51 (finding that out of 303 youths released from
two juvenile facilities in Florida, sixty percent re-offended within one year). Of course,
children who are adjudicated delinquent may be more prone to violence, and thus the




But are we teaching the child that crime is okay as long as you
have good lawyers? Furthermore, are trials not simply a waste of time
and resources since most children are, in fact, guilty, and there is usu-
ally enough evidence to support an adjudication of delinquency?
Starting backwards with the "efficiency" and "everyone charged is
guilty" arguments, the difficulty is that most adults charged with a
crime are also guilty. 322 Yet few argue that they should not have a
right to test the government's proof, even though the lawyer in de-
fense of a "guilty" person may have to cross-examine witnesses who are
telling the truth so as to make it appear that they are lying or mis-
taken.323 Moreover, there is an even stronger argument that children,
even if guilty, should have a trial. A trial brings home to children the
realization that they committed criminal acts and are deserving of
punishment. A guilty plea may obviate that lesson and children may
feel that they are being punished for their confession of guilt rather
than their criminal acts. Furthermore, a plea of not guilty necessarily
slows down the treadmill dispensing ofjustice that is prevalent both in
adult and juvenile court. The judge is forced to listen and see the
child not just as another burglar, but as an individual with unique
characteristics. I am not suggesting that there should be a trial in
every case. For various strategic and tactical reasons it may be better
for the child to plead guilty, such as in cases where the facts are so
horrendous it would be better that the judge not hear the gruesome
and overwhelming evidence.
With respect to the argument that getting guilty children off can
result in future crime because it engenders an attitude of being able
to get away with anything as long as you have a good lawyer, it is well
to remember that such a belief is grounded in reality. By insisting on
proof beyond a reasonable doubt, the child is learning another, per-
haps more important lesson; he or she is valued by the system, and
322. See supra note 2 and accompanying text (noting that over ninety percent of adults
charged with crime plead guilty). Of course, not every defendant who pleads guilty is in
fact guilty. For various reasons, including the possibility of a higher sentence after trial,
innocent defendants, to limit exposure, may plead guilty. See North Carolina v. Alford, 400
U.S. 25, 38-39 (1970) (holding that defendants may plead guilty even if they are unwilling
or unable to admit culpability if there is a strong factual basis for the plea); cf
Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364-65 (1978) (providing an example of a prosecu-
tor's "retaliatory" charging of a defendant who refused to plead guilty to a lesser offense).
323. See FREEDMAN, LAwYERS' ETHICS, supra note 4, at 43-49 (discussing how to cross-
examine a truthful witness); Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Beyond Justifications: Seeking Motivations
to Sustain Public Defenders, 106 HARV. L. REv. 1239, 1244-60 (1993) (discussing the typical
justifications for criminal defense attorneys). But see William H. Simon, The Ethics of Crimi-
nal Defense, 91 MICH. L. REv. 1703, 1703-06 (1993) (arguing that criminal defense lawyers
do not necessarily need a different adversarial ethic than the civil area of law).
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that the system, although imperfect, assures that individuals count
and that it is better to free a guilty person than to convict an innocent
one. It has also been shown that when people understand how the
system works and the rules to be followed, they are more likely to be-
324come law-abiding citizens. Alternatively, children may see the ac-
quittal as getting a second chance, particularly when they are told why
they "got off." Children are likely to recognize that the circumstances
leading to the acquittal may not occur again in the future and will
take this opportunity as a way of staying out of trouble.325
B. Holistic Lawyering in the Real World
Why do I offer an approach to legal representation for minors
that I acknowledge in its most fulsome form is probably unattainable,
at least here and now? The response is that even when we cannot
provide the very best approach, it is important to look at its compo-
nents, to see if there are parts of the very best that we can adapt and
use towards the betterment of our current state.
Some of these components can be seen at work in a number of
specialized juvenile public defender offices throughout the coun-
try. 326 Attorneys who go to work in these offices are there because
they want to be. They are permanently assigned to the juvenile divi-
sion and are not rotated to the other criminal law units.3 27 Moreover,
within the juvenile division, attorneys specialize in particular kinds of
proceedings such as waiver, juvenile delinquency, or appeals. Some of
these offices come close to the idealistic team approach, but they too
suffer from a lack of funds. Their virtues are expertise in juvenile law,
training programs for new juvenile law attorneys, 328 access to sister
324. Kathleen Sylvester, Attorneys Who Teach 'Street Law, NAT'L LJ., June 20, 1983, at 1.
Dr. Robert Hunter of Boulder, Colorado's Center for Action Research conducted a study
for the Justice Department on the effects of "Street Law" programs-teaching practical law
to high school age students--on juvenile delinquency. Id. The study stated that "'[w]hen
properly taught,' . . . 'the program reduces delinquency' [because the] students become
involved ... ; they understand better bow the system works and feel they have more of a
stake in it." Id.
325. See id. (explaining that juveniles understand legal consequences and ramifications
better when they have even a basic comprehension of the law).
326. YOUTH ADvOCACY PROJECT, at http://www.youthadvocacyproject.org/about (last vis-
ited Dec. 22, 2002); see also PAcIFICJUVENILE DEFENDER CNTR., at http://www.cjcj.org/pjdc
(last visited Dec. 22, 2002).
327. See, e.g., THE LEGAL AID SOCIETY, at http://www.legal-aid.org/legal.htm (last visited
Oct. 21, 2002).
328. The New York Legal Aid, Juvenile Division exemplifies expertise in juvenile law.
Attorneys are in the juvenile division because they choose to be; they often specialize in a
particular area ofjuvenile law, and work closely with the adult units, social workers, etc., to
coordinate representation for juveniles who are transferred to adult court. Id.
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criminal defender units for advice, political clout, and some money
for hiring outside experts when necessary. There are also stand-alone
public defender offices for children.3 29 They are not part of a larger
public defender system with other units, and thus, do not have access
to sister criminal law divisions.
Most of these public defender offices for children, whether part
of a larger unit or stand alone, are funded by the state and may have
associated investigators, social workers, psychiatrists, and psycholo-
gists.33 Many of these offices are very child advocate oriented and
actively seek to assure that children charged with crimes receive qual-
ity legal representation. Attorneys in these offices have a special inter-
est in juvenile law, and they share similar beliefs in protecting
children from the often brutal vagaries of the juvenile court system. 3 1
This advocacy orientation is not universally admired, particularly by
judges. 2
In some public defender offices, even those with juvenile divi-
sions, the practice of juvenile law is viewed as "sand box" law whose
stated purpose is to assure the best interests of the child, as if that
were easy to determine.333 In these offices, lawyers in the juvenile law
division are treated as second-class citizens with lower salaries and
fewer promotional opportunities, whose stay in the juvenile rights divi-
sion is a necessary, but unwanted experience, or worse, a demotion
for mistakes in the other divisions.3 34 Indeed, the juvenile division is
often seen as a place to "mark-time," until lawyers can elevate to the
"grown-up" criminal felony division.335 Attorneys in these juvenile
329. See, e.g., TRAVIS COUNTY, TEXAS, JUVENILE PUBLIC DEFENDER, at http://
www.co.travis.tx.us/juvenile-public-defender/default.asp (last visited Dec. 23, 2002) (pro-
viding representation to juveniles only). In addition, there are local offices often called
"child law centers" that are like public defenders in the sense that they represent indigent
children. See LEGAL SERVICES FOR CHILDREN, at http://www.lsc-sf.org (last visited Dec. 23,
2002).
330. This was certainly true when I practiced in Solano County, California. Although we
had access to the investigators employed by the office, they were often overworked and
delinquency cases would be relegated to the bottom of the pile.
331. See supra notes 255-261 and accompanying text (describing juvenile detention
facilities).
332. See SELLING JUSTICE SHORT, supra note 99, at 21-23.
333. See Giardino, supra note 8, at 275-76.
334. When I began working at the Solano County Conflict Public Defenders' Office, I
was told that if I remained in the juvenile division I could never get promoted past a
certain level, and the only way I could make a top salary would be to transfer to the adult
division. Even to become a supervisor for ajuvenile division, the attorney would first have
to work in the criminal courts.
335. I have talked with many public defenders who had been in the juvenile division for
several years as part of their "training." They were anxious to move on to the felony divi-
sion in order to begin their real work as a lawyer, representing clients in serious trials.
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units cannot always get access to outside experts as readily as those
representing adult defendants, they do not get secretarial support,
cannot freely use investigators, are encouraged to plead children
guilty and acquiesce to probation recommendations.336 Suffice it to
say that the practice of kiddie law in these offices does not bring much
prestige.
Many jurisdictions, however, do not have public defender offices
with juvenile law divisions; indeed, in many areas, there is no public
defender office. 37 Instead, private attorneys are appointed by the
court to represent indigent juvenile respondents. They often receive
less money than private attorneys appointed to represent indigent
adult defendants, 3 s thus making it more likely that experienced,
competent attorneys will not practice in juvenile court.33 9 When these
attorneys request outside experts, the applications are subjected to
very intense scrutiny and almost routinely rejected except in ex-
traordinary circumstances. 34 ° Lawyers who are too aggressive in re-
questing outside expert assistance or who practice zealous advocacy,
They viewed their time in the juvenile courts as part of their paying dues in order to move
up in the system.
336. Ajuvenile judge in California notes, based on his own observations, that attorneys
representing juveniles in delinquency proceedings are given less resources, higher
caseloads, and are not considered serious lawyers by others in the profession. See Judge
Leonard P. Edwards, A Comprehensive Approach to the Representation of Children: The Child
Advocacy Coordinating Council, 27 FAm. L.Q. 417, 418-19 (1993).
337. Even in those jurisdictions with public defender offices, courts use appointed coun-
sel for conflict of interest cases when there are multiple defendants, which in juvenile
court occurs frequently.
338. In Texas, juvenile attorneys have typically received a fraction of what attorneys
would receive for the same type of case in criminal court. It was not until after the passing
of the Fair Defense Act that the judges in Harris County, Texas increased the fees allocated
to defense attorneys in juvenile court to be equal to those in criminal court. See HARRIs
CouNT',, TEX., FAIR DEFENSE ACT: STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUN-
SEL FOR INDIGENT AND NON-INDIGENTJUVENILE REsPONDENTS § 10 (2002). This was the first
increase for court appointed attorneys in juvenile court for seventeen years. Discussion on
Fair Defense Act at Juvenile Section Conference of the Texas State Bar (April 2002).
339. In 2001, the Texas legislature passed a Fair Defense Act to improve the legal repre-
sentation provided to indigent defendants in criminal and delinquency cases. See TEX.
CODE CRiM. PROC. ANN. art. 1.051 (Vernon Supp. 2003).
340. Even for adults, it is very difficult for defense counsel to obtain expert services. See
David A. Harris, The Constitution and Truth Seeking: A New Theory on Expert Services for Indigent
Defendants, 83J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 469, 486-87 (1992) (discussing the unreasonable
requirements that must be met before defendants can obtain expert services). The Court
in Ake v. Oklahoma held, in the context of a capital case, that the state must provide access
to psychiatric evaluation and assistance when the indigent defendant has made a showing
that his sanity at the time of the crime will be of significance during the trial. 470 U.S. 68,
86-87 (1985).
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refusing to plead their clients guilty and challenging probation rec-
ommendations, are very often not reappointed.34'
Because of these constraints, many appointed attorneys plead
their clients guilty choosing not to seek alternative placement options
to probation recommendations. 34 2 I am not suggesting that all ap-
pointed counsel in juvenile court are not doing their job despite the
hurdles. Many are. However, many are not. What then can solo prac-
titioners or individual public defenders, who want to provide quality
legal representation for children, do to achieve that goal?343
1. Training Programs.-There are many training programs that
can help independent attorneys who accept juvenile cases. Continu-
ing Legal Education courses are available. 344 There are also joint
training programs with professionals from other disciplines.345 State
bar organizations, as well as local bar associations, juvenile courts,
public defender and district attorney offices, and nonprofit organiza-
tions also provide training on the legal aspects of representing chil-
dren in juvenile court.3 4 6 In fact, some jurisdictions have courses that
attorneys must complete before they can be placed on the court's ap-
pointment list.347 The quality of these programs vary. The attitudes
of the groups providing the training parallels the orientation of the
specialized public defender offices, with some practicing zealous advo-
341. See SELLING JUSTICE SHORT, supra note 99, at 22 (citing ajudge who stated that he
no longer appointed a specific attorney to juvenile cases because of his continual requests
for experts).
342. See PURITZ ET AL., supra note 114, at 35-38.
343. There are private attorneys that families retain when their children are charged
with committing criminal acts. Depending on the wealth of the parents, the attorney will
decide whether to provide zealous advocacy and receive assistance from experts. These
cases are decidedly in the minority, since most children charged with delinquencies come
from poor families who are unable to afford private attorneys and expensive expert assis-
tance. See THE REAL WAR ON CRIME, supra note 29, at 28.
344. Most programs that offer training for juvenile attorneys provide continuing legal
education credit for the programs.
345. See NAT'L ASS'N OF COUNSEL FOR CHILDREN, TRAINING AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE:
TRAINING AND CERTIFICATION . at http://www.naccchildlaw.org/training/
train certification.html (last visited Dec. 23, 2002) (stating that training programs have an
interdisciplinary application).
346. See, e.g.,JUVENILE LAw SECTION: STATE BAR OF TEX., LEGAL SPECIALIZATION, at http:/
/www.juvenilelaw.org/Specialization.htm (last visited Dec. 23, 2002) (explaining that the
Texas State Bar Asociation, Juvenile Law Section conducts an annual training on delin-
quency proceedings).
347. For example, in Harris County, Texas, as a result of new legislation, juvenile judges
require attorneys to have a certain number of continuing legal education credits prior to
being appointed as an attorney for a juvenile in delinquency cases. HARRIS COUNTY, TEX.,
FAIR DEFENSE ACT: STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES FOR THE APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL FOR
INDIGENT AND NON-INDIGENT JUVENILE RESPONDENTS § 5.1.8 (2002).
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cacy and some taking a guardian ad litem stance, and those perspec-
tives are reflected in the training courses. Moreover, since many of
these programs are presented by prosecutors, probation departments,
and judges, the defense point of view is not always fully represented,
and defense attorneys do not get the information they need to de-
velop vigorous advocacy skills for their clients. 3
48
Three organizations-the American Bar Association's Juvenile
Justice Center, 49 the Youth Law Center,5 ° and the Juvenile Law
Center311-founded the National Juvenile Defender Center (NJDC)
in order to upgrade the quality of representation forjuveniles.152 The
NJDC,353 along with its regional centers,354 provide training for attor-
348. I recently attended a state bar training course on juvenile law and almost all of the
presenters were judges or prosecutors, providing little information for defense counsel.
When the programs are developed and run by defense attorneys, the courses are more
likely to reflect an attorney's role as zealous advocate.
349. The juvenile Justice Center, located in Washington, D.C., began as a result of the
American Bar Association's involvement with the Juvenile Justice Standards Project, and
the Center provides leadership to judges, lawyers, legislators, and probation officers.
A.B.A., JUVENILE JUSTICE CTR., ABOUT Us, at http://www.abanet.org/crimjust/juvjus/
aboutus.html (last visited Dec. 23, 2002)
350. The Youth Law Center (YLC) has offices in San Francisco, California and Washing-
ton, D.C. YOUTH LAW CTR., WHO WE ARE, at http://www.youthlawcenter.com/htm/ylc-
who.htm (last visited Dec. 23, 2002). YLC was founded as a non-profit organization in 1978
"focusing particularly upon the problems of children living apart from their families in
child welfare and juvenile justice systems." Id.
351. The Juvenile Law Center (JLC), in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania "is one of the oldest
children's rights organizations in the United States" having been founded in 1975. JUVE-
NILE LAW CTR., ABOUT Us, at http://www.jlc.org/home/aboutjlc/who.html (last visited
Dec. 23, 2002). JLC provides direct representation to children facing delinquency charges
in Philadelphia, appellate advocacy in state and federal court, training for professionals
within the juvenile justice system, community education, and juvenile justice policy devel-
opment. Id.
352. NAT'L JUVENILE DEFENDER CTR., at http://www:abanet.org/crimjust/juvjus/
jdc.html (last visited Dec. 23, 2002). NJDC "was created to respond to the critical need to
build the capacity of the juvenile defense bar and to improve access to counsel and quality
of representation for children in delinquency and criminal proceedings throughout the
country." Id.
353. I sit on the national board along with the members of the management team (the
directors of the three founding organizations-Patti Puritz, Juvenile Justice Center; Mark
Soler, YLC; and Robert Schwartz, JLC) and representatives of each regional center. See
infta note 354 (describing the regional centers).
354. NAT'L JUVENILE DEFENDER CTR., supra note 352, at http://www.abanet.org/
crimjust/juvjus/jdc.html. In order to reach more juvenile defenders the NJDC started
nine regional centers. Id. They are: the Northeast Region (Delaware, New Jersey, New
York, and Pennsylvania); New England Region (Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, Rhode
Island, New Hampshire, and Vermont); Southern Region (Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Lou-
isiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, and South Carolina); Midwest Region (Illinois, Indiana,
Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, North Dakota, South Dakota, and Wisconsin); Central Region
(Arkansas, Kansas, Kentucky, Missouri, Nebraska, Ohio, and Tennessee); Northwest Re-
gion (Alaska, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, Oregon, Washington, and Wyoming); Mid-Atlantic
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neys appearing in juvenile court on such subjects as zealous advocacy;
developmental issues of adolescents; alternative dispositions; scientific
evidence; legislative advocacy; special education; school district policy;
family dynamics; reading expert reports; and substantive, procedural
and evidentiary criminal law issues, as well as civil practice.355 The
NJDC, which is funded by foundations and government sources,356 de-
veloped the MacArthur Training Modules which can be used any-
where in the country to help lawyers improve the representation
provided tojuveniles. 57 More than one thousand attorneys every year
benefit from these training programs that are provided at little or no
coSt.
3 5 8
2. Certification.-Texas is the only state that currently has a certi-
fication process for a specialization in juvenile law2 59 This is a recent
Region (District of Columbia, Maryland, Puerto Rico, Virginia, and West Virginia); Pacific
Region (California and Hawaii); and the Southwest Region which is housed at the Univer-
sity of Houston Law Center and which I direct (Arizona, Colorado, New Mexico,
Oklahoma, Texas, and Utah). Id.
355. For example, the NJDC holds a national meeting in which a variety of sessions are
presented on such issues as adolescent brain development, DNA evidence, zero tolerance
policies of school districts, confinement issues, determining competency of juvenile de-
fendants, and appellate practice. This meeting has been held annually in October in vari-
ous locations in order to make it easier for defense attorneys to participate. Additionally,
local groups have held training sessions covering some of the same topics in order to bring
the information to a greater number of defense attorneys.
356. Funding sources include the Casey Foundation, the Ford Foundation, and the
Soros Foundation.
357. A.B.A. JUVENILE JUSTICE CTR., UNDERSTANDING ADOLESCENTS: A JUVENILE COURT
TRAINING CURRICULUM, at http://www.abanet.org/crimjust/jujus/Macarthur.html (last
visited Dec. 23, 2002). The MacArthur modules cover a wide range of topics helpful to
defense attorneys in juvenile court. There are six modules on the following topics: adoles-
cent development; interviewing adolescent defendants, witnesses and victims; mental
health assessments for juveniles; child maltreatment and other risk factors leading to
chronically aggressive behavior in children; children in the juvenile justice system with
disabilities; and evaluating youth competencies. Id. Each module contains relevant infor-
mation to the topic, bibliographies, multi-media related materials, and other information
helpful in presenting trainings in these areas.
358. Id. This is made possible by funding provided from foundations and government
agencies. See supra note 356.
359. The Texas Board of Legal Specialization sets the standards for specialization in a
variety of areas including juvenile law. See Standards for Att'y Certification of the Tex. Bd.
of Legal Specialization, at 1 (2001). There are general requirements for all areas of spe-
cialization that includes state bar membership, required periods of practice, good charac-
ter and reputation, references, continuing legal education, and substantial involvement in
a specialty area each year. Id. Part I. In order to qualify as an applicant for the juvenile law
specialization, the attorney must practice at a minimum of twenty-five percent of his or her
time in juvenile law. Id. Part II, § I(A).
[VoL. 62:288
BEST INTERESTS EQUALS ZEALous ADVoCACY
implementation, which began in October 2001.6" It is still too soon
to evaluate this program; however, if it is anything like existing special-
ization exams in Texas, lawyers will have to spend time learning juve-
nile law and practice. It will be a rigorous certification and
examination process. The exam consists of two parts-three essays
and one hundred multiple choice questions. 6' The essays cover a
wide range ofjuvenile law subjects including juvenile arrests, searches,
first time offender programs, juvenile confessions, waivers of rights,
juvenile detention, pre-trial proceedings, certification as an adult, the
adjudication hearing, dispositional procedures, modification of dispo-
sitions, mental illness or retardation proceedings, determinate sen-
tencing proceedings, access to juvenile records, and confidentiality of
juvenile hearings.362 The multiple choice section of the exam covers
ethics, rules of evidence, civil procedure, appeals, criminal procedure,
and adjudication of juveniles in municipal court.363
In addition to the exam, the application process requires addi-
tional attorney qualifications. The lawyer must provide proof of hav-
ing participated in every aspect of juvenile court practice from
detention hearings, to jury and non-jury adjudicatory proceedings, to
appeals and post-adjudicatory remedies in state and federal court. 3 6 4
The lawyer must have also been first chair in three of the following
four instances-three jury trials, three appeals, five contested non-jury
trials and three certification or determinative sentencing hearings.365
The attorney must have practiced full time for the past five years,
three of which have been in Texas, with at least twenty-five percent of
his or her caseload being in juvenile court.3 66 References are also to
be provided with the application and must be from three lawyers who
practice in the same geographical location as the applicant.3 67 In ad-
360. STATE BAR OF TEX., 2001-2002 STATE BAR OF TEX. SECTION REPORTS, available at
http://www.texasbar.com/globals/tbj/ulyO2/sectionreports.asp (last visited Dec. 23,
2002). Thirty-two attorneys passed the first exam and received the juvenile specialization.
Id.
361. TEX. BD. OF LEGAL SPECIALIZATION, JUVENILE LAW EXAM SPECIFICATIONS (2002),
available at http://www.tbls.org/Cert/attexmjv.pdf (last visited Dec. 23, 2002).
362. Id. at 2-5.
363. Id. at 5.
364. Standards for Att'y Certification of the Tex. Bd. of Legal Specialization Part II,
§ I(B) (2).
365. Id. Part II, § I(B)(3).
366. Id. Part II, § I(C). This qualification may deter talented attorneys applying for cer-
tification since fees in juvenile cases tend to be low, and therefore, they may be unable to
earn sufficient income if twenty-five percent of their caseload must be in juvenile court. See
PURITZ ET AL., supra note 114, at 24-25.
367. See Standards for Att'y Certification of the Tex. Bd. of Legal Specialization Part II,
§ IX(A).
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dition, one reference must be from an attorney who has opposed the
applicant in a juvenile proceeding, and one from a judge who has
personal knowledge of the lawyer's work in juvenile court.36
Although the application process and requirements are quite ex-
tensive, there are several elements still lacking. One area that is obvi-
ously missing is training in the developmental process ofjuveniles and
the physiological, intellectual, and emotional differences between
juveniles and adults. A comprehensive knowledge of child develop-
ment is necessary for a lawyer to be a zealous advocate for youth in
juvenile court."' Second, there is no evaluation of the attorney's
knowledge of the criminal court process, even though an attorney
may find that representation of a juvenile would also take him or her
to criminal court such as in waiver hearings.3 70 Moreover, even if the
case is to remain in juvenile court, lawyers must know about criminal
law and practice so as to be able to make arguments that these crimi-
nal law practices should be required in juvenile court. Third, the em-
phasis in the certification process is on delinquency proceedings and
very little information is required about school disciplinary hear-
371 37237ings, special education, the process for the mentally ill child,373
and dependency proceedings, even though there is often an overlap
between the systems.37 4 Clearly, however, the certification process is a
368. Id. Part II, § II(B)-(C). While this requirement may strengthen the quality of attor-
neys in juvenile court, it runs the risk of a buddy system that keeps out those who believe in
zealous advocacy for children in juvenile court.
369. YOUTH LAW CTR., 2000 ANNUAL REPORT 13 (2000).
370. See Griffin v. State, 765 S.W.2d 422, 430-31 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989) (en banc) (hold-
ing that if a juvenile gives a statement prior to a transfer hearing, the Family Code would
apply; however, if Miranda warnings had been given to the minor after the transfer, and
the minor made a subsequent statement, it could be admissible in criminal court).
371. This is particularly important since, oftentimes, acts which trigger such hearings
often end up in juvenile court. Eric Blumenson & Eva S. Nilsen, How to Construct an Under-
class, or How the War on Drugs Became a War on Education, 6J. GENDER RACE &JUST. 61, 65
(2002).
372. A knowledge of special education law is necessary as many children are not doing
well in school because they need special assistance, and when that is denied it can lead to
the child committing criminal acts, LEARNING DISABILITIES Ass'N, SPECIAL ED LAw &JuVE-
NILE JUSTICE (Nov. 1995), at http://www.ldanatl.org/bulletins/MH-1 1_95.html (last vis-
ited Oct. 26, 2002).
373. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 55.02-.66 (Vernon 2002) (providing a substantial
amount of law that juvenile attorneys need to know about when dealing with mentally ill
children).
374. The California legislature alludes to the fact that the dependency and delinquency
systems overlap by enacting the statute as follows:
[w]henever a minor appears to come within the description of both Section 300
and Section 601 [(dependency)] or 602 [(delinquency)], the county probation
department and the child protective services department shall, pursuant to a
jointly developed written protocol described in subdivision (b), initially deter-
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positive step in the right direction, and is likely to lead to an even
stronger certification process.
3. Informal Networking.-Of course, there is always informal
networking with attorneys who are experienced in the field and with
other nonlegal professionals in nonprofit organizations.375 These or-
ganizations provide services to children, attorneys, and courts, and
one can get expert nonlegal assistance such as psychiatric services, al-
ternatives to training school placements, evaluations of the needs of
the juvenile, and programs for at risk youth, either at minimal or no
cost.376
Offering to second chair with an established attorney can be of
great value to new lawyers, so that the inexperienced attorney does
not unduly affect their clients.3 7 Another source can be university
faculty who are experts in the field and may be willing to offer their
knowledge and support, often without a fee. Faculty experts can be
either in law or other disciplines such as social work, psychology, edu-
cation, political science, or foreign languages.3 78
Training manuals have been developed by public defender of-
fices and these are often available at little or no cost to the private
attorneys practicing in juvenile court.379 In fact, the NJDC has a for-
mine which status will serve the best interests of the minor and the protection of
society.
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 241.1 (a) (West 2003). Accordingly, whenever a minor appears
to be dependent and delinquent because of overlapping definitions, procedures, and
other features of the dependency and delinquency systems, the statute requires that the
child be placed under one status only-either as a dependent or delinquent.
375. One such organizaiton is Southwest Key. Southwest Key is a non-profit organiza-
tion that was founded in 1987 and works with at-risk and troubled youth. See SOUTHWEST
KEY PROGRAM, THE SOUTHWEST KEY STORY, at http://www.swkey.org/WAhoWeAre.asp (last
visited Dec. 23, 2002). The mission of the organization is to provide community based
treatment programs rather than programs in locked institutional facilities. Id. Southwest
Key has programs in Arizona, California, Georgia, Puerto Rico, Texas, Wisconsin, and New
Mexico, and serve over 5000 children a day. The program is community-based, offering
skills-based treatment with family-centered services which are culturally relevant to the
child and family. Id.
376. Again, Southwest Key provides an example of such a program. SOUTHWEST KEY
PROGRAM, INC., SOUTHWEST KEY'S PROGRAMS: PROGRAM MODELS, at http://www.swkey.org/
programs.asp (last visited Dec. 23, 2002).
377. See Sanford J. Fox, Juvenile Justice Reform: An Historical Perspective, 22 STAN. L. REv.
1187, 1237 (1970) (discussing the pitfalls of having inexperienced counsel).
378. I have used such experts on numerous occasions all to the benefit of my clients. As
previously discussed, I used a psychologist in a case and was able to convince the judge to
ignore the probation department's recommendation and allow my client to return home
to her family. See supra p. 149 (describing Joan's case).
379. See, e.g., LEGAL AID SOCIETY OF NEW YORK, at http://www.legal-aid.org (last visited
Nov. 17, 2002) (providing juvenile practice manuals to attorneys).
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mat for a general training manual that can be used anywhere in the
country with plug-ins from local jurisdictions."' 0 Finally, appointed
attorneys can turn to law school clinics for assistance with complex
cases."8' This not only helps the child, it exposes law students to the
practice of juvenile law who may in turn enter the field themselves
with a solid appreciation of what is entailed in representing a child
accused of crime.38 2
4. Lawyer's Commitment and Attitude.-The biggest and least ex-
pensive change the solo attorney can make is rethinking the role of
counsel in juvenile delinquency proceedings. The best way to re-
present children in juvenile court is to provide zealous advocacy. This
requires that the attorney spend numerous hours with the client,
treating the client with respect and allowing the child to participate in
the process. The lawyer must be committed to providing quality rep-
resentation to the child, just as he or she would give to an adult, refus-
ing to treat the court and its personnel with velvet gloves unless it
inures to the benefit of the child. I am not advocating rudeness or
snarling, but the attorney must be willing to buck the paternalism and
the "we know what is best" attitude of the juvenile court. Perhaps
most importantly, the lawyer must be a creative thinker who will delve
beyond the surface issues of guilt and innocence.
Take for example, the case of a young man who had been placed
at the California Youth Authority (CYA), a state youth prison. He
took advantage of schooling, counseling and work opportunities in his
placement. He was released on parole, enrolled in high school to get
his diploma, obtained a part-time job, developed a relationship with a
very nice young woman, and lived at home, helping his mother and
providing emotional support for his younger brother. He had also
secured a guarantee of employment upon his graduation from high
school. Shortly before graduation he was arrested because of an inci-
dent that had occurred prior to his CYA placement. He admitted that
he was in the fight and had knifed the other boy. His main concerns,
380. A.B.A. JUVENILE JUSTICE CTR., supra note 357, at http://www.abanet.org/crimjus/
juvjus/macarthur.html. These manuals provide information on how to handle a delin-
quency case from beginning to end and include forms and checklists that may be helpful
to defense attorneys. Id. The manual is available on disk and hard copy. It would be easy
enough for local jurisdictions to adapt the information and forms to the local practice.
381. See PURJTZ ET AL., supra note 114, at 43 (explaining that law school clinical re-
sources are available to juvenile attorneys).
382. For example, at the University of Houston Law Center, students have the opportu-
nity to take an in-house juvenile defense clinic, but also have the opportunity to work with
local practicing attorneys on delinquency cases where the attorneys can use some addi-
tional assistance.
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however, were missing his graduation, losing his part-time job, possi-
bly losing his future employment, and destroying his image as a role
model for his younger brother. Because the attorney took the time to
talk to him and elicit his concerns, she was able to persuade his teach-
ers, principal, employer, and parole officer to all testify on his behalf.
In addition, she was able to get his employer to hold his job and his
future employment placement, all in time for him to attend his high
school graduation. He was the first member of his family to graduate
from high school. Thejudge recognized what this meant to the family
and particularly to his younger sibling. What is important to note is
that money is not what made the difference. There was no need to
call in outside experts. All that was necessary was that the lawyer lis-
tened to her client and used all her professional skills to assure that
her client did not go back to CYA.
Another example involves a youth charged with burglary. He also
failed to attend school regularly, which ordinarily leads to a harsher
disposition for a child."' To provide proper representation, the law-yer must not only try to get the child acquitted, but if that fails, to get
the best possible disposition."' That in turn requires the lawyer to
find out why the child is a truant. Merely asking the child if it is true
that she does not go to school regularly will not ferret out the whole
problem.385 Does the mother use the child as a translator to deal with
welfare officials? Does the child have health problems, physical or
mental, that result in irregular attendance? Is the child a victim of
school phobia or is she being bullied beyond endurance? Does the
child suffer from any form of learning disabilities? Is one of the teach-
ers picking on her and exposing her to ridicule? Is the teacher mak-
ing sexual advances? Does the child not have enough clean clothes to
wear to school? Does the minor have a part-time job that keeps her
up late, causing her to oversleep, waking too late to go to school?
Or suppose the juvenile runs away from home. Why? Many court
personnel see this behavior on the part of girls as accompanying sex-
ual acting out.38 6 Studies show, however, that a large percentage of
383. Rosenberg & Rosenberg, supra note 186, at 546-47.
384. See PURITZ ET AL., supra note 114, at 51-53 (advocating for the child-client's access to
zealous representation at dispositional hearings).
385. See Rosenberg & Rosenberg, supra note 186, at 556 (explaining that an attorney
should inquire beyond the child-client for symptoms of school phobia).
386. See generally Mareva Brown, Study: Girls Ill-served by Justice System, SACRAMENTO BEE,
May 2, 2001, at http://classic.sacbee.com/news/news/old/localO5_20010502.html (last
visited Dec. 23, 2002) (stating that a probation officer debated whether to detain a female
juvenile because of her promiscuity).
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girls who leave home are being sexually abused."8 7 This information
is the most difficult to elicit." 8' The parents will hide it and so will the
girl who often feels shame or is afraid she will not be believed.38 9
The need to dig below the surface is necessary even in cases that
seem straightforward. Suppose a teenager is charged with committing
arson of the family home and readily admits it. The lawyer who ac-
cepts that and pleads her guilty, condemns the girl to a locked state
facility, because private treatment centers, for insurance and liability
reasons, usually do not take arsonists. 390 What the lawyer may not
know is that the girl was systematically sexually abused by the father
for years with the complicity of the mother. The girl simply saw no
other way out.
One final example is the last case I tried as a public defender. My
client was a sixteen-year-old charged with assault who had previously
been adjudicated a delinquent. The victim was lying on the ground,
bleeding, and surrounded by several people, including my client.
When the police officer arrived at the scene, he observed blood on my
client's pants. He told me that he had been in the park and his dog
had fought another dog, and that is how the blood got on his pants. I
requested that the prosecutor do a DNA test. For unknown reasons,
he refused. I had promised my client, who was being detained, that I
would try his case before I left. I subpoenaed twenty witnesses who
had observed the dog fight. On the trial date, the prosecutor took
one look at the twenty witnesses, and requested a continuance to do
the DNA test. I opposed that request because my client was locked
up, the district attorney had had time to do the test, and it was my last
week of work. The judge dismissed the case with prejudice.
The type of representation I am describing is necessarily time-
consuming. The problem for the lawyer is caseload and money, which
are intimately related. 91 The lawyers in solo practice face difficult
387. A.B.A. & NAT'L BAR Ass'N, Justice by Gender: The Lack of Appropriate Prevention,
Diversion and Treatment Alternatives for Girls in the Justice System 10 (2001). Fifty-nine
percent of all arrests for runaways in 1999 were girls. Id. at 17-18. Delinquent girls usually
have several things in common: a history of sexual abuse, fragmented families from death
and divorce, serious physical and mental problems, drug-abuse problems, and home lives
affected by lack of consistency and conflict. Id. at 6-8.
388. See id. at 10 (explaining that many delinquent girls have been traumatized by sexual
abuse and react negatively in an oppositional manner).
389. See id. at 13 (noting that families of delinquent girls have higher instances of gen-
eral dysfunction, as well as mother-daughter conflict).
390. PAUL SCHWARTZMAN ET AL., U.S. FIRE ADMIN., FEMA, ARSON AND JUVENILES: RE-
SPONDING TO THE VIOLENCE (SPECIAL REPORT) 22-23 (undated).
391. See PURITZ ET AL., supra note 114, at 24-25 (explaining that many public defender
systems are plagued by low salaries and huge caseloads).
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choices-their ethical responsibility for representing their clients in a
competent manner, and the need to pay their rent and provide for
their families. 92 This is very hard. If the lawyer takes fewer cases,
allowing him or her to spend more time with each client, but not pro-
viding enough financial gain to pay the bills, he or she will not be able
to stay in the practice. As a result, the child-client may not have any
source for legal representation. Political clout to increase the fees
paid to appointed attorneys in juvenile court becomes a necessity.393
Recently, the Appleseed Foundation, a nonprofit think-tank, con-
ducted a study of the quality of representation received by indigent
defendants in criminal and juvenile court in Texas.394 The Founda-
tion issued a report detailing the difficulties of representing indigents,
noting the low fees paid to attorneys representing such clients. 395 As a
result of this report, the Texas legislature passed the Fair Defense Act,
which significantly increased the fees that attorneys representing indi-
gents could receive.396
While I have focused mainly on defense counsel, it is important
to note that district attorneys in juvenile court also have similar
caseload problems. 397 They, however, usually have greater access to
resources such as investigators and secretarial support.3 98 Decreasing
the prosecutorial caseload would also benefit children in juvenile
court because it would facilitate more accurate assessments of the
quality of evidence in individual cases. If the district attorney in my
last case was not besieged with a huge docket, he might well have
agreed to do the DNA test which would have resulted in my client's
earlier release.
392. See id. at 22-27 (discussing a number of difficult issues that public and private juve-
nile defenders face in this practice); see also Edwards, supra note 336, at 418-24 (giving a
first-hand account of the difficulties facing juvenile defenders).
393. See supra notes 338-339 and accompanying text.
394. SELLING JUSTICE SHORT, supra note 99, at 7-8.
395. Id. at 18-24.
396. Jennifer Shubinski, County Public Defense Gets High Marks, EL PASO TIMES, Apr. 11,
2002, at lB.
397. See Stacey Gurian-Sherman, Back to the Future: Returning Treatment to Juvenile Justice,
CRIM. JusT., Spring 2000, at 30 (explaining that dockets and caseloads in the juvenile jus-
tice system are out of control).
398. SELLING JUSTICE SHORT, supra note 99, at 27. In some jurisdictions it is not the
district attorney that handles delinquency cases. For example, in New York, the district
attorney, county attorney, or corporation counsel may file petitions in delinquency mat-
ters. See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT 310.1 (McKinney 1999) (authorizing a presentment agency to
file a petition which originates ajuvenile delinquency proceeding). In New York City the
corporate counsel files delinquency petitions, and the office may not have access to the
same resources as the district attorneys. Juan C. v. Cortines, 679 N.E.2d 1061, 1068 (N.Y.
1997) (noting the role of corporation counsel).
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I have no easy answer to the problem of low fees and large
caseloads. To avoid the money issue I worked for the public defend-
ers office. But, it did not, and typically does not, solve the caseload
problem. The organization itself, and the lawyers, must put a cap on
the number of cases each attorney can take .399 They must make clear
that they are not going to provide ineffective assistance of counsel,
and money must be made available to hire additional attorneys. The
private attorney must do the same.
One might argue that the funds for increased quality representa-
tion should instead be used to improve the actual programs and facili-
ties for children in juvenile court. I might agree with that view if I
believed the states would put sufficient resources into these programs
and facilities. But even if the states should do that, money for high-
quality representation is still necessary to assure that children,
whether guilty or innocent, receive due process of law, and that only
those children who need treatment receive it.
CONCLUSION
I wrote this Article in the hope of inspiring dialogues and discus-
sions about how to increase the quality of legal representation injuve-
nile court delinquency proceedings. Some will view my beliefs as
naive, idealistic, and unnecessary. My own experience, and that of
many colleagues across the country, tells me otherwise. I do agree,
however, that my views on the attorney-client relationship are some-
what radical. I have great trust in children and their abilities to solve
problems if they are given the necessary tools and information to do
so. Treating children as objects to whom things are done, infantilizes
them and makes effective treatment less likely to succeed. Dealing
with children as persons who have a large stake in the proceedings
and whose input is respected is the most likely means of keeping chil-
dren out of trouble. Thus, when I represent children as respected
individuals, I am not just providing effective assistance of counsel, I
am also, in some way, helping those children develop the necessary
skills and sense of self that will enable them to survive and indeed, to
prevail.
399. See PURITZ ET AL., supra note 114, at 24-25 (explaining that high caseloads create
barriers to the effective representation of juveniles). The National Advisory Commission
on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals has recommended that public defenders, in gen-
eral, have no more than 200 cases per year. Id. at 25. Yet, most attorneys in juvenile court
handle much higher caseloads. Id. For example, in a study conducted by the Juvenile
Justice Center of the American Bar Association, public defenders reported having
caseloads ranging from 250 to 550 cases per year. Id.
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